The Chinese Puzzle

By

Arthur Ransome

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"'The Chinese Puzzle' is an apt name for a book dealing with the complicated politics of the Far East, but Mr. Ransome's vivid pages give us a real insight. He is as shrewd an observer as any I have encountered, and he provides certain clues which should be of great assistance to those who would attempt its solution."

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THE CHINESE PUZZLE

THE CHINESE PUZZLE

BY

ARTHUR RANSOME

WITH A FOREWORD BY

THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, M.P.

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FOREWORD

BY

THE RIGHT HON. D. LLOYD GEORGE, O.M., M.P.

"THE CHINESE PUZZLE" is an apt name for a book dealing with the complicated politics of the Far East, but Mr. Ransome's vivid pages give us a real insight. He is as shrewd an observer as any I have encountered, and he provides certain clues which should be of great assistance to those who would attempt its solution.

In this country we can view the stage of China only as it were from the back of the gallery. The scene is remote, the plot is highly complex, the characters bear strange and difficult names; inevitably there are times when our attention wanders, and the interminable marches and counter-marches, the alliances and betrayals, the chatter and invective that make up the play, seem of little significance to us in Europe. Then suddenly there arrives upon the scene a battalion of the Coldstream Guards; the trumpets sound, the chorus of the Press proclaims the news that vital British interests are in danger, and that even at the risk of war they must be defended. We have still thousands of British troops quartered at Shanghai with no immediate prospect of their quitting. What is it all about? It is vital we should know and understand.

We cannot coerce China into trading with us, therefore we must make friends with her. And before we can

do that we must remove those time-honoured indignities which the doctrine of extra-territoriality has inflicted upon her and which, like Japan and Turkey before her, she is now resolved to cast off.

Chinese Nationalism is essentially a just cause. In so far as its leaders are inexperienced and at times incompetent to control the emotions they have aroused in their followers, we may be compelled to use force to protect our rights until saner counsels prevail. But we must at all costs avoid creating the impression that the Nationalists are our enemies. With prudent handling they may prove our best friends. Let us quote a passage from a book by one of the greatest British authorities on China, Sir Robert Hart, who was Inspector-General of Customs in Peking during the Boxer revolt, and therefore unlikely to take too favourable a view of the Chinese character [1] :—

> What we want is, in a word, that our people shall be as safe and their interests receive as certain protection in China as elsewhere ; and, to go to the root of the matter at once, this will never be the case till we treat China and the Chinese in just the same way as we treat any other civilized Power or people—say America and the Americans. This mending of old clothes will not do—a new garment is wanted ! An international cancer is at work : as long as it works it will irritate and embroil, and it must be extirpated if international health is to be enjoyed and a sure foundation laid for building up a condition of mutual prosperity and mutual good will.

That is as true to-day as when it was written. Our interests and China's interests are identical. We both want peace and we both want trade. If we continue to

[1] *These from the Land of Sinim*, p. 129.

insult and exasperate each other we are likely before long to have neither.

This is in substance, as I understand it, the view that Mr. Ransome expresses in this book, and I feel that it is of the greatest importance that it should be widely appreciated.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

September 15, 1927.

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BRITISH POLICY IN CHINA

THERE are in this book a number of references to British policy in China. I think a useful purpose may be served by reprinting here the text of the British Proposals published on February 3, 1927.

THE BRITISH PROPOSALS

The following is the text of British Proposals officially handed to China as published on February 3, 1927:—

"*When a satisfactory settlement has been reached in respect of the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang and when assurances are given by the Nationalist Government that they will not countenance any alteration, except by negotiation, of the status of British concessions and international settlements, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to concede at once, on the lines indicated in the enclosure hereto, a large part of what is desired of them by the Chinese Nationalist Party. So liberal and generous a step cannot in their view be regarded otherwise than as an earnest of the fair and conciliatory spirit with which they are animated.*"

(*Enclosure*)

(1) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the modern Chinese law courts as competent for cases brought by British plaintiffs or complainants and to waive*

the right of attendance of a British Representative at the hearing of such cases.

(2) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the validity of a reasonable Chinese nationality law.*

(3) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to apply as far as practicable in British courts in China the modern Chinese civil and commercial codes (apart from procedure codes and those affecting personal status), and duly enacted subordinate legislation, as and when such laws and regulations are promulgated and enforced in Chinese cities throughout China.*

(4) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to make British subjects in China liable to the payment of such regular and legal Chinese taxation not involving discrimination against British subjects or British goods, and paid by Chinese citizens throughout China.*

(5) *His Majesty's Government are prepared, as soon as the revised Chinese penal code is promulgated and applied in Chinese courts, to consider its application in British courts in China.*

(6) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss and enter into arrangements, according to the particular circumstances at each port concerned, for the modification of the municipal administrations of British concessions so as to bring them into line with the administration of the special Chinese Administrations set up in former concessions, or for their amalgamation with former concessions now under Chinese control, or for the transfer of police control of the concession areas to Chinese Authorities.*

(7) *His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the principle that British missionaries should no longer claim the right to purchase land in the interior, that Chinese converts should look to Chinese law and not to the Treaties for protection; and that missionaries' educational and medical institutions will conform to Chinese laws and regulations applying to similar Chinese institutions.*

Speaking at Birmingham on January 29th, Sir Austen Chamberlain said :—

" The principal changes the Chinese desire in the old treaty are: (1) The extra-territorial position of foreigners, who can only be tried by their own courts; (2) the tariff provisions preventing China from raising her duties on foreign goods; and (3) the quasi-independent status of foreign concessions.

" Britain is prepared to change all these points because the present system is antiquated and unsuited to modern conditions. It no longer provides the necessary security and protection for the peaceful avocations of our merchants. . . .

". . . We do not ignore the present inconveniences and difficulties, but we are thinking of our relations with China in the next century."

THE CHINESE PUZZLE

THE SHANGHAI DEFENCE FORCE

THERE are two extreme views on the subject of the British troops in China. One distinguishes between the sending of troops and the Hankow negotiations, and approves of the former while regarding the latter with resentment and disgust. The other makes the same distinction, but, approving of the negotiations, urges that the sending of troops is illegal and that they should never have been sent at all. Both these views fail to realise that the two things—negotiations and troops—cannot be so arbitrarily dissociated.

It must not be forgotten that the Shanghai Defence Force plays an important part in London as well as in China. This point is recognised both in Hankow and in Shanghai by every Chinese to whom I have had the opportunity of putting it. The English Government is prepared to go a very long way to meet the demands of New China. Fortunately for China, it is a Conservative Government, so that when it adopts a sane policy it is secure from opposition on its left. It meets, however, and expects to meet, knowing its men, opposition from within the Conservative party. Conservatives say to it: "Since 1842 you have told us that the life and property of the British in China is guaranteed only by the treaties you are now preparing to modify. On your

own showing you are now taking a serious risk with regard to these lives and properties." The Government is able to silence this opposition, dangerous to it because within its own household, by pointing to the Shanghai Defence Force. The troops that we see in Shanghai to-day are sent here as much against die-hards in London as against revolutionists in Shanghai. It must be realised, therefore, that the British troops, though illegally in China, are a part of Sir Austen Chamberlain's conciliatory policy.

Admitting that a gesture of that kind was necessary, let us now examine its effects not in London but in China. We must distinguish between its local effects in Shanghai and its general effect on the Chinese situation. In Shanghai it is hard to distinguish between Chinese and foreign business. The interests of the large class of *compradores* and other Chinese working for or in connection with foreign firms are identical with foreign interests. Its point of view is greatly influenced by the foreign point of view. Though it does not say so publicly, it undoubtedly is much relieved by the presence of the British troops. Chinese landowners in Shanghai are also inclined to see in the presence of the troops a sort of guarantee of the value of their property. Even more suggestive is, to me, the admission by many Chinese whose sentiments are undoubtedly Nationalist that there is some justification for the presence of the troops in the Settlement, both as a narcotic for the extremely sensitive nerves of the foreign community and as a deterrent to such expressions of Chinese sentiment as might complicate the situ-

ation in such a way as to make impossible its peaceable solution.

"The Chinese," said one such man to me, "are a practical people. Labour here is Chinese. It will not challenge combat with an obviously overwhelming force."

"You mean that the presence of the troops will prevent demonstrations within the Settlement?"

"Yes," he replied, "it will keep things quiet until the Nationalists are in control of the district around Shanghai. Your Government will then be faced with the problem of how to take its troops away before their presence brings about a complication more dangerous than the mere parading of a mob."

"What do you mean?" I asked.

"Another boycott," he replied. "That seems to me inevitable, and I do not see how you are going to meet it."

This particular Chinese is a man of sober judgment and very moderate views. Yet it was he who said to me: "When I saw your troops occupying the railway station I felt it was more than I could stick."

The station to which he referred is only just outside the Settlement. I said: "Do you then distinguish so sharply between foreign troops in the Settlement and foreign troops immediately outside it?"

"It is only a foreigner who could ask that question. Within the Settlement it is possible to find some justification for the presence of your men. One foot, one yard outside it, and it is impossible to disguise, even from those who, like myself, do their best to close their eyes to it, an actual unforgivable invasion of China.

The putting up of barbed wire, the making and manning of defences in Chinese territory by British troops, makes it impossible for people like myself to go on arguing that your men are here to act not as soldiers, but as police. It is you who are insisting that you are in a hostile country. It is you who show us that you fear not disorder within the Settlement but something from without. We ask what? The answer is, China. You may not mean it, but to us Chinese the putting of British troops outside Settlement territory radically changes their significance. Inside the Settlement they are an illegality; outside it they constitute a declaration of war. Military necessity? Have you forgotten that you went to war with Germany because she considered military necessity an excuse for invading Belgium?" So much for the Chinese viewpoint.

Now for the viewpoint of the English in Shanghai. That is well illustrated in a letter published to-day in the *North China Daily News*.

SIR,

I live just west of the Hongkew Park, in sight of British soldiers and within rifle-shot of their defences, yet I have been told that it is a matter for my own consideration whether I have to evacuate my house and property, as it is said to be outside the defended zone. All that I have is to be derelict. My neighbour, also a Britisher, has already evacuated. And all for a little shortsightedness.

What I mean, and would suggest now, is that a reasonable view would indicate that the present serried line on the north is a poor line to defend, and the logical line of defence is one to be continued unbroken from the Western lines, linking across the Soochow creek, extending across country to the extreme eastern end of the foreign settlements. This line would bring the North station and the Rifle-butts well within

the defences, giving more room for refugees and relieving the congestion in the settlements, which, already bad, will be intolerable with the advent of hostile forces. In this way, the military operations will all be in the open country, which is a very important consideration.

With a view to conserving the sources of supply of greens, an important district is that part of the country between the northern district and Kiangwan, and, if practicable, a line connected in the same manner, but including Kiangwan, which will have to be occupied, will bring Kiangwan Race-course inside the defences, and there is no better camp than that for the *Northern* defences. Agreement with the Chinese military is very probable, and co-operation almost certain. But, even without it, the idea is worth exploring, and I commend it for what it is worth.

(*Signed*) DERELICT.

SHANGHAI,
March 3, 1927.

There is an argument which, carried to its logical conclusion, would demand an occupation of all China. It is a claim that any Englishman who owns land in a foreign country can, on the ground of nationality but without regard to national policy, claim the use of the British Army to preserve him from suffering from phenomena the risk of which he took when he acquired that property.

Now as to the effect of the presence of the British troops on the general Chinese situation. Their presence tends toward a unification of China, by uniting China against ourselves. This is illustrated by the formal protests of the Peking Government, the local Chinese commander, and the Nationalist Government, to say nothing of innumerable chambers of commerce and organisations of students, Christians, editors, university

professors, and what not. It brings the North nearer to compromise with the South. If we take a very long view, this may be a good thing in that it brings nearer the day when it may be possible to negotiate with China instead of with different organisations claiming sovereignty over the same territory. But it has serious ill effects. For example, it all but prevented the signing of the Hankow Agreement. That agreement is a small thing, unimportant in itself, but the House of Commons in applauding its signature showed a wiser instinct than the Shanghai newspapers who jeered, from supposedly patriotic motives, at it and them. If that agreement had not been signed the policy of conciliation would have run grave risks of being strangled at birth. Nationalist generals were inquiring from their Foreign Minister what was the meaning of the troops. Were they to be considered part of Sun Chuan-fang's forces defending his overlordship in Shanghai? How would it be possible to make it clear to Nationalist soldiers that they had to face only the demoralised troops of Sun Chuan-fang when a foreign army, magnificently equipped, was visibly standing at Sun's back? Retention of some of the troops at Hong-Kong was used by Eugene Chen as an excuse for signing, but I have the best of reasons for knowing that at Hankow one part, and that the least important, of Britain's policy as nearly as possible frustrated the other.

The "Old China Hands" are one in saying that Chinese are not outraged but very properly scared and subdued by the presence of foreign troops in China. They are wrong. Perhaps twenty years ago they would

have been right. To-day they are wrong because they overlook the fact that the great majority of the Chinese leaders, almost all of the younger and more energetic, have either been educated abroad or received a Western education in China. The active yeast in the great fermenting vat of China is youth impregnated with the ideas for which for a long time the people of the West have been willing to lay down their lives. The " Old China Hands," when asked to consider this point, blame the missionaries for having spoiled China, but hasten to set up a new argument, saying that these Western-trained young Chinese are a tiny minority in the country. They overlook the fact that China is in one of those periods of rapid political development that we call revolutionary, and that in such periods it is always a small minority that inspires and leads. The young Chinese have already been able to show that they are able to induce mass-support for just those ideas which, proud commonplaces in Europe, are held to be poisonous heresies in the mouths of men with different coloured skins. The Cantonese boycott of Hong-Kong should have taught something to the " Old China Hands," but, seemingly, did not.

Now the news of the detention of some of the troops at Hong-Kong had two important effects—both significant. It made possible the signature of the agreement at Hankow, and it called forth at once talk of a renewal of the boycott in the South. Canton is like Lancashire in that what it thinks to-day other people begin to think to-morrow. Talk of a boycott on the Cantonese lines as a means of meeting what is considered an inva-

sion of China had begun in Shanghai as soon as it was known that the troops were coming. That talk became louder as soon as it was known that the troops here had moved outside the Settlement boundaries. Many Chinese who deplore the effect that a boycott will have on Chinese as well as on British trade believe that such a boycott is certain as soon as Shanghai ceases to be an area of active civil war, if not before. A boycott hitting hard at people's pockets tends to produce violent words and violent actions. Some Chinese will attempt to disregard it and risk their lives for the sake of immediate profit. Naturally protection will be given to them. There will be innumerable occasions on which it will be very difficult to avoid just such incidents as have before fanned smouldering hostilities into fire. The danger is the greater because so much local foreign opinion regards hostilities as desirable and says openly that the Chinese " need hitting every twenty years or so." The only way to lessen the danger is for sober heads on both sides to keep constantly aware of it.

Let me summarise :—

1. The sending of a force of additional policemen to Shanghai was justifiable.

2. Unfortunate necessity compelled us to substitute soldiers.

3. Foreigners here have done their utmost to prevent the Chinese from understanding the reason for which the soldiers were sent.

4. The occupation of land outside the Settlement has made it difficult even for the wisest Chinese to believe in our peaceable intentions.

5. There is a grave danger lest the presence of the troops may indirectly bring about reactions of a kind that may result in even greater losses to British trade than those which are inevitable during the rebirth and reorganisation of China, and may postpone indefinitely the realisation of that wise policy of meeting Chinese aspirations on which our Government has embarked.

6. To demand the immediate removal of the troops is to demand the creation of a new danger of another kind.

7. To demand that they should be retained within the Settlement is to lessen the risk that the policy of making friends with China will be, insensibly and against our will, turned into a policy of a very different kind.

THE SHANGHAI MIND

NOTHING could be further from the truth than to imagine that the Englishmen in Shanghai represent an English outpost or share the English point of view. The Shanghailanders hold that loyalty begins at home and that their primary allegiance is to Shanghai. They proclaim that British property is in danger when they need British troops to defend them, but have shown during the last few months that the acceptance of this assistance does not in any way prevent them from doing what they can to make impossible the realisation of a British policy which they do not like. They make difficult any good understanding between England and China because, just as we at home are apt to think of them as English, so the Chinese, in China, make the same mistake. English newspapers take from three to six weeks to reach China. English policy and thought are therefore judged by the Chinese from the newspapers published in English in places like Shanghai and Tientsin. The Chinese naturally turn to these papers and judge England and England's policy by what they find there. It is impossible to persuade them that what they find is an expression not of the British but of the Shanghai mind.

This is lamentable because of certain characteristics of that mind. Of these the most important is that it has been entirely unaffected by the events of the last twenty-five years. Whereas both England and China

have been profoundly affected by the war, the Shanghailanders behave and talk as if the events that have followed 1914 had passed, so far as they are concerned, in a different planet. For them the last important political event was the suppression of the Boxers. Europe is far away from them and China, at their very doors, seems almost as far. They seem to have lived in a comfortable but hermetically sealed and isolated glass case since 1901, and since English information on China and Chinese information on England comes for the most part through Shanghai and similar places, it cannot be too clearly understood, both in England and China, that Shanghailanders of English extraction belong, if they belong to England at all, to an England that no longer exists.

These people " think imperially " in the manner of the Rand magnates at the time of the South African War. They are at pains to see in the present stage of the Chinese revolution a new Boxer rebellion, to be put down by force. They think of " anti-foreignism " as China's original sin, to be exorcised by periodical penances. They look round on their magnificent buildings and are surprised that China is not grateful to them for these gifts, forgetting that the money to build them came out of China. Controlling the bottle-neck through which the bulk of Chinese trade must pass, they prosper upon it coming and going and forget that it is the trade that is valuable to England and not the magnificent buildings which big profits and small taxes have allowed them to erect. English prestige is at stake when their interests are threatened, but unless English policy

coincides with their own they are prepared at any moment to be the Ulster of the East.

This they deny, of course, but no impartial reader of the Shanghai newspapers during the critical months of January, February, and March of this year will be prepared to support them in that denial. Extremely conservative, like most business communities in foreign countries, they are prepared to have their country go to war for them rather than to adjust themselves to inevitably changing conditions. They were at first incredulous and then disgusted to find that the English Foreign Office took a longer view. Their point was not gained when England decided to send out the Shanghai Defence Force. What they wanted was a reversal of England's policy, or such events as should make that policy impossible. Day after day in their newspapers they advertised the coming of the troops, while England's policy of conciliation towards China was tucked away in small paragraphs. England explicitly declared her neutrality as between the opposing parties in China. Day by day the Shanghai newspapers poured abuse on the party of the Nationalists. The Shanghai Commissioner of Police went out of his way to express his sympathy with the suppression of Kuomintang propaganda. No Chinese, reading the Shanghai newspapers, could have had any other impression than that the important part of British policy was the sending of the troops and that England was fundamentally and irrevocably hostile to the only movement in China which had as its object the freeing of the country from the wholly unscrupulous war-lords who secure Shanghai's approval by suppressing labour

and the resentment of the whole country by the wholesale robbery which is making its normal development impossible. Finding that England definitely did not mean to go to war with Chinese Nationalism, Shanghai proceeded to speculate on the mistrust of Russia which is so well advertised by newspapers at home. If England could not be persuaded to suppress "the new Boxer movement," she might be induced to "fight Russia in China," and Shanghai expanded to fantastic proportions the very small body of military and civilian advisers who are with the Nationalists, while being oddly silent about the very large number of Russian officers and men who are fighting on the opposite side. Actually the strongest propaganda of a kind to produce hostility between England and Nationalist China is that of the Shanghai daily newspapers published in English. Shanghai's policy and Great Britain's are not the same. The danger is that Great Britain will knuckle under to Shanghai, and not the other way about. The Shanghailanders are not moved to greater concessions towards English policy by the presence of British troops, but the reverse. Secure behind the troops, they are less than ever ready to revise their attitude.

That attitude is definitely bellicose. The Shanghai newspapers magnified the damage done by British guns at Wanhsien, and magnified the damage done by Chinese mobs at Hankow and Kiukiang. All that calculated insult could do to disincline the Nationalists to come to agreement with us at Hankow was done by them. When the Nationalists did come to agreement with us on the lines of expressed British policy in China, the agreement

was described in Shanghai as a betrayal. The Shanghai mind regards the outrages at Nanking as a means of altering British policy, and is disappointed that the Note sent to the Nationalists is not strong enough, even though it calls upon the Nationalists to assume responsibility for acts which only persons whose brains have been so steeped in propaganda that they have ceased to be minds could possibly believe to have been desired by the Nationalist Government. But, for Shanghai, the Note is not strong enough, since it leaves a chance for British policy to escape shipwreck. Shanghai will not be satisfied unless Sir Austen Chamberlain's winter policy is scrapped and, with high water on the Yangtze, a summer policy takes its place with a naval demonstration up the river, the " occupation of strategic points," an open attack on the Nationalists, and an attempt to plant the war-lords once more on the lid of the boiling Chinese cauldron.

THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

In almost all that is written about the Chinese revolution there is a dangerous tendency to pick out and exaggerate one or other of its many facets. One party fixes its attention on the factor of foreign privilege, and is thenceforward blind to all aspects of the revolution except that of a struggle against foreign domination in China. Another party is content with the names of generals, and thinks of the struggle merely as one between Chiang Kai-shek and his satellite generals on the one side and Chang Tso-lin, Yang Yu-ting, and their satellites on the other. A third party, blinking in the glare of Moscow, sees red everywhere and imagines the struggle as one between Communism and anti-Communism. All these misconceptions, or partial views, are dangerous, and all, while honestly held by some people, are exploited by others to justify policies of their own. It is difficult for contemporary observers of an upheaval on so vast a scale, in which motives are so complex, to estimate its general tendency.

The last question asked to-day, but the first that will be asked by the historians of fifty years hence, is : What are the economic changes in China that have produced the present lack of political equilibrium ? What, from the point of view of the economist, is happening in China ? The foreign business man on the spot replies at once that China is economically going to the dogs.

But he is looking not at what is happening in China as a whole but at the effect of the upheaval on his own business. That is something that in this inquiry must be resolutely disregarded. Much more significant is the surprised comment of some of the big shippers that the effect of the upheaval has been much less than might have been expected. Much more significant is, for example, the highly satisfactory report of the directors of the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank. Their chairman, at the annual meeting of shareholders at Hong-Kong on February 26, 1927, announced an increase in the net profits, and said :—

> In most countries trade would be wellnigh impossible under such conditions as have been existing in China during recent times, and the one bright spot is the courage and determination with which the Chinese merchants, bankers, and tillers of the soil carry on their business and occupations in the face of all difficulties. It is due to their doggedness that the wheels of commerce, though clogged, keep moving, and the Customs revenue steadily increases, though the result is nothing compared to what the figures would be under a peaceful and ordered regime.

Dr. Otto, in the Chinese *Economic Journal* for February 1927, points out that China's trade turnover in 1924 was all but five times her trade turnover in 1900. Chinese banking is on a small scale, and Chinese banks can hardly compete with the big foreign banks, especially as these do not suffer in the same way from the effects of Chinese political instability; but the number of Chinese banks, as distinguished from credit organisations of older type, rose from one in 1902 to fifty-eight in 1920. The Chinese mining industry is also a small

affair, but, though China's actual mineral resources are said to be poor,[1] her industry has been growing, and the proportion of Chinese to foreign capital engaged in it has been increasing. The last twenty-five years show a steady growth of Chinese manufacturing industry. Along the Yangtze Valley and in the neighbourhood of the railways there are a good many small factories, primitive little organisms, for the most part at a standstill on account of the civil war or the demands of the soldiers, but none the less significant. A hundred years ago there were similar little makeshift furnaces and Lilliput chimneys affronting the shepherds in our Lancashire and Yorkshire valleys. Now all these symptoms point in one way, and suggest that there is coming into the political arena in China the class which in Europe has long been the most powerful, that what we are witnessing in China is not the decline of that country but its growing pains, and that in future years Chinese, looking back on the events which are now disturbing us, will consider them much as we consider the great changes in our social structure that preceded the Victorian elysium of the trading and manufacturing classes.

No other hypothesis will explain the willing support given to the revolutionary forces by classes who could under no circumstances identify their interests with those of revolution of a different kind. Unwilling support is, of course, given by bankers and Chambers

[1] By Dr. V. K. Ting, the Chinese geologist, who disagrees with the general belief that China is a country of wellnigh inexhaustible mineral wealth.

of Commerce and merchants to whichever side is strong enough to enforce it, but it is a remarkable fact that the Kuomintang and Dr. Sun Yat-sen found, during the long years when their cause seemed almost hopeless, continuous support from the Chinese business men both in China and abroad. It was only as an afterthought that they realised the need of active support from the labouring masses. No other hypothesis will explain the unanimity of the students in favour of the revolution, a unanimity which does not recognise any geographical distinction between North and South in the struggle. The universities of the North are, in the eyes of the militarists, " hotbeds of revolution " no less than those of the South. In general the geographical distinction is a false one, and tends to obscure the real issue. It is a difficult thing to find an educated Chinese (outside that limited class whose interests are bound up with those of their foreign employers) who does not proclaim in any company in which he feels himself safe that his sympathies are with the Kuomintang.

What, then, are the revolutionaries revolting against ? Ask any of them that question, and they will tell you that they are revolting against two things, " Feudalism " and " Imperialism." By " Feudalism " they mean domination by war-lords. By " Imperialism " they mean " the use by any (other) nation of its political and military ascendancy for subjecting to its economic encroachment a foreign country, or territory, or race." That is to say, that they are trying to shrug off whatever in their opinion impedes their own economic develop-

ment. But that is a fair definition of the aims of all respectable " bourgeois " revolutions.

Let us turn again to the actual position in the country. China is popularly supposed to be on the verge of bankruptcy. She is already defaulting in payment of interest on some of her many borrowings. But it is important to remember that her absolute indebtedness is small. According to the *China Year-book* of 1922, she owed 1,906 million dollars, or rather less than 10s. per head of her population. In the United Kingdom our indebtedness per head is something like £150. At the same time the Chinese Customs revenues have been steadily increasing (if we disregard the drop this year obviously due to the intensity of civil war). Yet though China ought to be in a better financial position than formerly, she is actually in a worse, because of the inexhaustible appetites and the power to satisfy them enjoyed by the Chinese war-lords. But for foreign control of the Customs and foreign power to pay interest on loans before handing over any surplus, China would have gone bankrupt long ago, and the essential services for which the Customs are responsible would have come to an end.

The necessarily dual character of the revolution is here illustrated. The Chinese bourgeoisie complain that foreign domination in China hampers their own development, that only political freedom will enable them to compete with the foreigner, that foreign control of the Customs prevents them from using the Customs, as they think, for the advantage of Chinese industry, that the foreigner is in a privileged position in China, and so

on. But they are the first to admit that if abolition of foreign control of the Customs were to mean the undisputed control of the Customs by the war-lords, China's case and their own would be worse even than it is. The war-lords would no doubt like Chinese control of the Customs. So would the revolutionaries, *after* the elimination of the war-lords. This is a fair example of the way in which both sides in the civil war may be united as against the foreigner and yet irreconcilably opposed to each other.

Communism at this point of Chinese history is a wholly irrelevant slogan. The China in which that slogan might have a real meaning does not yet exist, and consequently Chinese Communists, the moment we examine them at all critically, turn out not to be Communists. They are sufficiently like Communists to get their heads cut off, but that is all. The most famous alleged Communist in the Hankow Government is Dr. Hsu Chien, the Minister of Justice. Let us just look for a moment at the new law of inheritance promulgated by the revolution. The old law was that when a man died all his relations shared in his inheritance. We have passed, says Dr. Hsu Chien, "a new law that inheritance is in the direct line only, unless a man draws up a specific will to dispose of his property. If a man dies intestate, and has no descendants in the direct line, his property passes to the State to be used for purposes of education." Dr. Hsu may satisfy his Communist conscience with that last provision, but the essential change is that whereas the old law prevented the accumulation of capital, the new one facilitates it. It is the

innovation of a bourgeois and not a Communist revolution. It is an accident that a number of the young Chinese revolutionaries call themselves Communists, though it is not an accident that people like Chang Tso-lin or foreign business men in China seize upon that name to justify as " anti-Communism " actions and policies which have a much more personal motive.

UP THE YANGTZE TO HANKOW

AFTER a very cold night, I woke to find that we were steaming through thick yellow water in a river that might have been a sea. For a long time there was little to be seen, except a few fishing-boats. Then we were heading in towards three hills. One of the hills was topped by a pagoda from a willow-pattern plate, in blue and dark blue, with upturned corners to its successive roofs. Below the pagoda the hill fell steeply, and houses with similar roofs clustered on its side almost one above another down to the plain, a flat country rather like that of Norfolk, with bare, pale willows, winter-withered grass, small drab huts and barns beside which I could see blue-robed Chinese. The foreshore was heavily groined to protect it against the river, which, judging from its colour, is steadily carrying China out to sea. H.M.S. *Wolsey*, a destroyer, passed us going up-river. A Chinese lighter, propelled by long, pivoted sweeps, came out to meet us to take passengers and luggage ashore. In her stern a Chinese stood with a big bamboo round which was twisted a long snake of scarlet fire-crackers which were going off with a rapid tattoo of loud bangs. This is the Chinese way of welcoming the first ship up the river in the Chinese New Year, the celebration of which was in full progress regardless of the civil war. The *Suiwo* slowed down, a rope was flung and made fast, the barge was jerked into our gait, nearly upsetting the man who was

preoccupied with the ceremonial letting off of crackers, a few Chinese, men in robes, women in trousers, followed by their baggage, were tossed into the lighter, the rope was cast loose, and the *Suiwo* proceeded on her way.

We came to Nanking in the early morning, and were already moving up the river again before I came on deck. The river was now narrower, but still very wide, with steep, clayey banks. Here and there were the first signs of the spring crops, in patches of pale green, beside little fragile huts with matting roofs. In the background, away from the river, were steepish little hills. The narrowing of the river made the amount of small sailing traffic more obvious, small sampans under a single sail, or moved by a *yuloh*, a bent scull on a pivot, worked with a motion like that used in propelling a dinghy with an oar over the stern, two-masted and three-masted junks, with sails of long strips plaited alternately in and out of horizontal bamboo battens, and a few bigger vessels, *lorchas*, as big as small Baltic coasting schooners.

In the afternoon of February 6th we came to Wuhu, where we tied to a hulk. We were met by a terrific New Year's din. Boats put off for the sole purpose of greeting us with fire-crackers and other boats were full of men beating cymbals, banging gongs with chunks of wood and greatly enjoying themselves. On the bank parties were walking along beating their cymbals and banging their gongs, not collecting money, but making a noise for their own happiness and the good luck of the community. The Chinese passengers tumbled ashore anyhow, passing their baggage over the rail before the

ship was tied up, though there was no sort of hurry. One man, in the excitement of passing across two bundles and a birdcage, dropped a bundle of notes between the ship and the hulk. For a moment there was dismay. But the bundle of notes bobbed up, floating almost submerged. He hurried along the hulk and came back with a double-pronged boat-hook at the end of a long bamboo. It was rather like trying to pick up a small pea with a big two-pronged fork. Everybody crowded to watch. He got the packet cornerwise across the prongs and lifted it. A man leant to catch it. Just before it reached him it dropped. All the spectators roared with laughter. He got it again, and again, just before the man could reach it (if he had put his cap under it he would have had it easily), it fell amid new applause. At the third try he got it in a disappointed silence.

There is no Concession at Wuhu. But huge compounds and buildings of the A.P.C. were flying the British flag, and close beside them their rivals of the Standard Oil Company were flying the American. There was a wharf and enclosures with piles of what looked like iron ore, under the Japanese flag. The fine grey building of the Customs was flying the five-striped flag of the Republic, and this, with variations, was flown by an immense amount of small shipping. Wuhu is not so very far from the front (between Sun Chuan-fang and the Nationalists), and I suppose little ships find it best to proclaim their allegiance. Only the foreigner can afford to disregard the front and to steam up and down river from one side to the other of it as if

no civil war was being fought. But there was very little to be seen of the war. As we left Wuhu, the town's ducks, a flock of some thousands all swimming in a compact mass, were being shepherded across the river for the night by a couple of boats.

Some time in the early morning, steaming up the river, we passed from one side of the front to the other. At Wuhu there were rumours of Chinese gunboats that had gone up-river and attacked the forts of the Nationalists on the river bank. Up-river the rumours took a different form and spoke of shells from forts having sent damaged gunboats to seek shelter. It was a clear winter day of bright sunlight. The hills had grown nearer and higher, and seemed to be as big as the Lake hills, 2,000 to 3,000 feet. I learnt that we had actually passed into the Nationalist part of China by seeing for the first time troops of the Southerners. On the right bank of the river were some low houses and willow-trees. In front of one of the larger of the houses was a body of some two hundred men in the ordinary grey uniforms, drawn up as if on parade before two huge crossed flags, very different from the five-barred flag used by Sun Chuan-fang and the Northerners. One flag was blue with a white sun surrounded by a dozen short white rays, the other was designed like our red ensign, with a miniature of the blue-and-white flag in the place of the Union Jack. It is usual among non-Chinese to describe the ensign as a copy of the Russian flag, but it is much more like that of our own mercantile marine. It is also usual to describe the twelve-rayed sun as a star imitating the five-pointed star so often

seen in Russia, but Chinese tell me that design and colouring alike are a Chinese symbol for honesty, and that the twelve rays imitate the points of no star, but represent the twelve Chinese divisions of the day. In matters like this a certain choice in interpretation is obviously permissible.

We passed a vessel " tracking " up the river, two or three men walking along the top of the high bank with a tow-rope from the top of the mast. We also passed a fine little junk, with some dignitaries on board, including a very smart officer, some persons with big brassards on their left arm, and several Chinese civilians of rank. We steamed close under the Little Orphan, a precipitous isolated rock off the left bank of the river, with two temples on it. Then on the other side of the river we passed the entrance to the Poyang lake, but could see little, as the blaze of the sun was exactly behind it and, reflected from the water, left nothing visible but its own radiance. On that side of the river, however, on either side of the Poyang lake, were range after range of low hills. Among them, with snow upon its back, was a perfect imitation of Helvellyn.

February 8th.—Kiukiang is a town on the right bank of the river, with a background of the magnificent Lushan mountains. These rise to a height of 5,000 feet, and in a dip 3,500 feet up is the summer resort of Kuling. The evening sun lit up windows and roofs about a dozen miles away at this tremendous height in the snow-covered mountains. There was no snow on the lower slopes of the hills and none in the plain. Here, at Kiukiang, for the first time on the way up the river,

the war atmosphere was unmistakable and aggressive. There was no getting away from it. After this place was occupied by the Southerners there was some rioting in the Concession and demonstrations of anti-British feeling. The two big compounds of the rival oil companies were flying no flags, though they seemed to be unharmed, as far as one could judge from the river. It was still considered unsafe to be on shore. Officials and business men were living afloat. At the same time some foreigners had refused to leave Kuling and were living high up in the hills, well beyond reach of any protection that could be given them by the naval vessels in the river. As we arrived, beside the Chinese sampans that came out to collect Chinese passengers, a motor sampan and a motor boat came out to meet us, and a guard of marines, fully armed, was put on board. We might, indeed, have been in a country with which we were at war. Our captain was asked why he had brought any Chinese passengers above Nanking. We anchored in the middle of the river, and as dusk fell watched Kiukiang light up. It was possible in the dark to see where the British Concession began and ended, because there were no lights in it but a few street-lamps along the Bund, whereas in the rest of the town there were lights in the windows of the houses. At Kiukiang, unlike Hankow, there had been some looting and the Kiukiang agreement will contain a clause concerning compensation to be paid by the Nationalist Government.

We proceeded up the river after dark, and I noticed that the captain, in spite of what had been said at

Kiukiang, stopped as before at river-side villages and towns to allow his Chinese passengers to disembark, and also that at all these places we were greeted with the gleeful banging off of fire-crackers, as if the importance of arranging for the year's luck outweighed in the Chinese mind any national or international trouble whatsoever. In the morning of the next day it was possible to see by the scarlet paper decorations on the doors of the houses in the river-side villages that occupation by the Nationalists had not interfered with New Year traditions. Even the fishing-boats were similarly decorated.

About noon on February 9th we came into the long reach below Hankow. A wide stretch of river sweeps round a long bend, the outer bank cut out sharply by the water and showing the tremendous height to which the river rises when the snow melts in the Himalayas. The rise and fall of the river at this point is something like 40 feet. On the top of the bank were various small factories, mostly not working. The river itself was covered with little junks and fishing sampans, with thin, paper-like, ribbed sails. As we came nearer the town we seemed to be coming into some sort of small naval base. Destroyers of several nations, besides little river gunboats, were lying at anchor or moored to hulks and pontoons. A couple of British passenger steamers, one of them crowded with departing missionaries from up-country, were at anchor, and one Russian vessel, the *Erivan*, in ballast. A number of Japanese ships were moored one to another, discharging cargo, long lines of coolies with big bales staggering rapidly across

the foreshore, like rows of ants removing big white ants' eggs from a disturbed nest. All through the trouble, I was told, the Japanese steamers have been profiting by the almost complete cessation of activity on the part of British ships. The Hankow Bund is a row of good European buildings, dominated in the British Concession by the huge offices of the British and American banks and the great pile of the Asiatic Petroleum Company's building. Beside it, sheltering among trees in a big garden, the British Consulate looked a survival of more spacious and less sky-scraping times. British destroyers lay opposite the A.P.C. building.

HANKOW

THE most surprising thing in Hankow, to anyone who has come up the river from Shanghai expecting a sort of pandemonium, is the quiet and orderliness of the Concessions. A foreigner can walk about them at all hours of the day or night without being molested or even pointed at. The streets are swept, and as clean as those of the Settlement at Shanghai. Walking along the Bund, where the foreign Concessions face the river, you pass from the Japanese Concession to the ex-German, then to the French, then to the ex-Russian, and finally to the British. That is to say that you pass from an area under foreign control to one under Chinese, then through another under foreign control to two under Chinese. It is impossible to notice any difference in their upkeep. There is no proof in the way of neglect that the German Concession, for example, has already been for many years under Chinese control. One innovation is pointed out, and that is one that should never have been needed. Along the Bund embankment there is a pavement, separated from the actual roadway by a strip of green, on which there are a number of seats. On that side of the roadway it is the only pavement. It forms a natural promenade along the Yangtze River. Formerly no Chinese was allowed to use it or to sit on the public seats overlooking the river. That prohibition has been broken down, and Chinese now have as much right as foreigners

to walk along the front above the greatest of Chinese rivers.

The time that I have spent in Hankow has fallen during the celebrations of Chinese New Year, and much more of the rejoicings have been seen in the Concessions than in old times. The different guilds, and apparently independent enthusiasts also, organise dragon processions, and these this year have naturally made a point of marching along the embankment where formerly they were prohibited, and with a certain triumphal air have pranced through the once sacred streets. This, at least to the visiting foreigner, is a great gain. A terrific rhythmic gong-beating in the street brings him out of doors. A crowd of men and boys with paper lanterns, gay by day and still gayer at night, precede a dragon borne aloft on poles by twenty or thirty men at regular intervals along its snake-like length. It has a huge carved head painted red, blue, yellow, and white, with loose, goggling, swaying eyes. Its body is a long tube enclosing at intervals barrel-shaped lanterns. It ends in a carved tail, desperately waggled by a skilful bearer. Immediately before it marches a juggler, swinging two lanterns, at the ends of ropes, round and round and in and out like Indian clubs, twirling and dancing as he goes. It is followed by a wildly decorated palanquin, by giants on stilts, by other fancies. The whole procession is surrounded by gong-beaters, cymbal-bangers, rattlers of split bamboo sticks, and frenzied spendthrifts of fire-crackers. During the past week I think I have seen a score of such processions. There have been few attempts to give political meaning

to them. One represented the funeral of British Imperialism, with Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, and others as mourners following the coffin. But for the most part they have been as full of fun and as devoid of politics as an English pace-egg play.

Ordinary amusements proceed as usual. The foreigners play golf. The races are held. The kinematograph theatres are nightly packed by people, Chinese and English, who want to observe the antics of " a peppy little society miss " (I quote from local criticism) and other heroes and heroines of Hollywood. The most exciting events of each day are the aerial acrobatics of a Nationalist aviator, who gives the whole Chinese population a crick in the neck by catherine-wheeling in a series of loops at no very great height over the town. There is a lavishness about his performance that made me suspect he was a Russian, and on inquiry I found that he was, and that this daily performance of his is undertaken to give confidence to unlucky Chinese pupils who accompany him. The only " news interest " of the place while I have been in it (apart from the O'Malley-Chen negotiations) has been the opening of the trial of two of Wu Pei-fu's generals captured at Wuchang. Normal Chinese procedure seems to be to allow the opposing general to escape with his loot, or, if he fails to take the opportunities given him, to behead him or shoot him at once. This detention of distinguished prisoners followed by a dramatically staged trial under a specially made code of offences against the revolution is a new thing. But the trial was at Wuchang, on the other side of

the river, and it caused no excitement whatever at Hankow.

Everything is, in fact, so peaceful that it is hard to realise that in this same place during three or four days at the beginning of January things were not peaceful at all. That there was then grave disorder and serious danger is certain. But some of the livelier details in the wild, terrifying story of events in Hankow which reached the outside world fade on investigation. For example, it is not true that the Hankow Club was sacked and its valuable library damaged. The library is intact, and recalcitrants who refused to be immured in the Asiatic Petroleum Company's building were going to the club as usual during days when the outside world was informed that it was unsafe for any Britisher to show himself in the streets. The Chinese story was even more exaggerated. The Chinese spoke of a massacre by British marines. There was no massacre. Not one man was killed. The British spoke of an organised attack. The chief characteristic of the attack was that it was utterly without organisation, in that it had excitement without objective. For some time the Concessions had emphasised their idea that they were outposts in a hostile country by putting up sandbag defences and barbed wire, behind which there had been something of a display of armed men of different kinds. The British Concession abuts on the Chinese city, and just outside its boundary is the Custom-house, a building with high steps well adapted to the purposes of orators. This place has been described as the Hankow Trafalgar Square. On the day the trouble

began there was a big meeting here which overflowed into Concession territory. Marines were landed. Stones were thrown at them. The marines behaved with a restraint that it is impossible to admire too much. No shots were fired, but in a scuffle two Chinese were bayoneted and one marine (with his bayonet, which had been taken from him by Chinese). A number of men were hurt by stones. The crowd became violently excited, and only the withdrawal of the marines prevented a serious conflict.

The situation seems to have been extremely well handled by the British Consul-General, Mr. Herbert Goffe, who, perceiving the futility of declaring war on China with a handful of marines and some volunteers, did the only possible thing for a wise man to do in putting the onus of keeping order on the Chinese authorities. The alternative was a repetition of the folly of Wanhsien. This was avoided. The crowd destroyed the obnoxious barricades, tore off the metal plaque on the base of the war memorial (a very senseless proceeding, since there was nothing in the war memorial to offend Chinese feeling in any way), and wandered aimlessly through the Concession. The French and Japanese barricades were also removed, but I have been unable to discover whether this was done by the crowd or by the French and Japanese. The attitude of the crowd was extremely hostile, and the evacuation of women and children was a wise precaution. The concentration of Britishers in the Asiatic Petroleum Company's building during the days of high tension simplified the problem of the Admiral, which was that of keeping

in a position at any moment to evacuate them without loss of British life. Lying in the river, he would have been able to keep up a barrage to right and left while the British community walked unmolested down to the ships. That in itself seems perfectly sound. But it was kept up far too long. The Concession was quiet after January 7th. Englishmen were walking about and did not suffer the slightest molestation. The incarceration in the A.P.C. building lasted until near the end of the month. This long sustention of the idea of imminent danger might well have reacted on the Chinese in such a way as to produce the very danger it was intended to avoid. Fortunately it did not. But Chinese who knew English played on the name of the building and spoke of it as the Admiral's Prison Compound. The long refusal to open banks, etc., which, by paralysing more than British business, also might well have produced more trouble, was not persisted in because of any danger, but because it was thought that this refusal would bring pressure to bear on the Chinese. Actually tension slackened very quickly, and continued to slacken throughout the Chen-O'Malley negotiations.

The result of those negotiations has been disappointing to those foreigners who, in their astonishing ignorance of the modern world, believed that an agreement altering the administration of a Concession would mean that the Nationalist Government would at once imitate Wu Pei-fu in forcible suppression of labour. There is civil peace, but the workmen are still unsatisfied with wages and hours. The A.P.C., the Standard Oil Company, the Japanese firms, and the Chinese firms

are all finding it difficult to keep their feet and their heads in a snowstorm of demands from the newly enfranchised unions. The workmen are intoxicated at finding that they have been able to compel a general rise in wages to a point high for Hankow but still very low by Western standards. Some of their demands are just, some extravagant. The employers, of course, think that the men would not make demands if they were not compelled. The birth-rate of new unions is high. The latest union to make demands is that of the laundrymen, who left a letter (in English) at the door of each room in my hotel. I quote it in full :—

DEAR SIRS,

On account of the standard of living grows higher and the wages of washing-man is increased, we hardly can support ourselves. In order to make live in the society, we organize a association which will do you no harm except asking you a favour. We think all the foreigners at Hankow will sympathize with us. Now the list of washing clothes is mentioned at followeing :

(1) The average price of washing clothes in different size is 6 cents.

(2) The price of it, in middle size is 8 cents.

(3) The price of it in large size is 10 cents.

(4) The price of it, in a month, will be increased half of the total number.

Yours truly,
The members of the association of washing-man.

This probably means a 50 per cent. increase. Not living in Hankow, I am ready to give it, if only on account of the washing-man's politeness.

The publication of the agreement signed by Mr. O'Malley and Mr. Chen has been received quietly. It

seems to be generally recognised by all but a few die-hards in Shanghai that the time has come when a change in the relations between British and Chinese is inevitable. It is, of course, impossible not to sympathise with those Englishmen who have grown accustomed to the established ways and now look forward rather gloomily to life in a Chinese world very unlike the old. It is easy to understand the pained surprise of business men who have for years been able to count on Chinese labour at a stable wage, low in comparison with wages at home, at finding themselves face to face with trade unions which have yet to learn the difference between extravagant and economically justifiable demands. At the same time, one can but feel that they have had a long and profitable innings. Freed (except in the case of a few big firms) from income tax both in China and in England, freed from the difficulties of large and increasing wage bills which keep business men in England awake at nights, they can hardly grumble if at last they have been stirred, even rudely, by historical processes that have so far passed them by. They have been jerked in a few months from the Victorian era to the present day. They are naturally a little breathless, a little ruffled, a little incoherent, but they are already recovering the power to look calmly ahead and, looking back, to admit to themselves that it would have been futile to try to stand against the tide.

THE KUOMINTANG

I FOUND in Hankow that it was impossible to talk for five minutes with any of the members of the Nationalist Government without being reminded that the Government is Revolutionary. This word was with them almost a word of incantation. They, with the exception of Hsu Chien (Minister of Justice), laughed at the idea of being "Communist," but insisted that they were "Revolutionary." Not only that. They kept reminding me that they were the Government not of an already completely victorious revolution but of "a revolution on the march." They deprecated for that reason too precise criticism of their Government organisation. It was, they said, a makeshift, like a camp-kitchen.

Since I left Hankow a good deal has happened to illustrate the impermanence of the organisation in the particular stage of development in which I saw it. It is being altered from day to day, as the Russian Government organisation was altered, in accordance with changing needs and with the manœuvring of the representatives of different political tendencies that find expression in it. But even in its temporary, makeshift form, liable as it is to surprising fissures due to the strains and stresses to which a Government in a country undergoing rapid change is naturally subjected, it is a constant challenge to the traditional instruments of government in China, and illustrates better than anything else the essential internal change that the revolu-

tionaries hope to effect. The movement for abrogation of the unequal treaties affects foreigners so intimately that they are inclined not to see that, since all China is in agreement on this point, the struggle going on in the country is concerned with something else. We consequently hear a lot about the misdeeds of the Nationalist Government in so far as they affect ourselves, but nothing at all of the main difference between that Government and other ruling powers in China, which is, of course, the point which most keenly interests the Chinese.

Now the revolution in China is directed against " warlords," " tuchuns," military strong-men who by grabbing cash-boxes are able to pay mercenaries to keep them in control of the sources of income. Everything possible has been done both in China and abroad, by our own newspapers and by the supporters of the warlords, to cover over this aspect of events. As far as it has been possible to do so the struggle has been described as one between a number of different war-lords, including Chiang Kai-shek. So far, at any rate, the real importance of the struggle has been due to the fact that, while his opponents were independent warlords, Chiang Kai-shek was consciously and willingly subject to the control of a civilian Government. The immediate visible object of the Nationalists in China has been the substitution of civilian for military control. " Popular government " is a slogan for the future. All that they at present claim is that within the territory held by their troops they seek to substitute the authority of a party for that of any individual.

The Kuomintang (People's party) unites in a single organisation people of all provinces of China who, however their political complexions may vary, agree in accepting the three principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as a general programme. These principles are so vague in wording that almost anybody could subscribe to them. At rare intervals is held a Congress of the Kuomintang, attended by delegates from all the provincial organisations of the party. At the second Congress, the last, which met on January 1, 1926, there were 300 delegates. The Congress elects a Central Executive Committee of thirty-six members, with twenty-one deputies and a Control Commission of nine. The Central Executive Committee is the supreme party authority, and remains so until the meeting of the next party Congress. Recent troubles in the party have been caused by alleged attempts to evade the authority of the Central Executive Committee by submitting matters in its competence only to irregularly constituted bodies.

The Central Executive Committee appoints a Political Bureau, which "controls policy," and a small Standing Committee, which looks after "party routine." The Political Bureau appoints the Government Council. At this point it is necessary to make a digression and to explain that the Political Council which was functioning when I was in Hankow was no longer identical with the Political Bureau appointed in January 1926. The list of members of the original Bureau is as follows: Wang Ching-wei, Tuan Yen-kai, Chiang Kai-shek, C. C. Wu, Sun Fo, T. V. Soong, Tuan Pin-shan, Hu Han-min, Chu Peh-tak, with, as deputy members, Kan

Nai-kwang, Chen Kon-po, and Shao Li-tse. But several of the most important of these men were in political eclipse, notably C. C. Wu, who had found it better to go, as he was meeting serious criticism both from General Chiang Kai-shek and from the Radical Kuomintangists. The chairman, Wong Ching-wei, had left China to recover from heart disease after fighting a losing battle with Chiang Kai-shek over the position of political commissars in the Nationalist army. Tuan Yen-kai had thereafter been acting chairman. In actual practice, at Hankow the Political Bureau had been replaced by a Political Council constituted by all the members of the Central Executive Committee who happened to be present. As the majority of those present was composed of the more Radical, the effect of this change was that the functions of the Political Bureau were being performed by a body rather more Radical than had been the intention of the Central Executive Committee.

The Government Council is more or less of a Cabinet, but includes persons who cannot be expected to attend Cabinet meetings, as, for example, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General away up in Shensi, whose allegiance to the Kuomintang was rewarded by this appointment. Its members need not be members of the Central Executive Committee. There is an inner Cabinet, called the Standing Committee, which, when I was in Hankow (I apologise for this reiterated qualification, which is necessary because of the giddy speed of Chinese events), consisted of five members: the chairman, Tuan Yen-kai, and the four Ministers—Foreign Affairs (Eugene Chen), Finance (T. V. Soong), Communica-

tions (Sun Fo), and Justice (Hsu Chien). Other Ministers have since been appointed, presumably increasing the size of the inner Cabinet. These new appointments have been of a character rather more "Left" than would have been approved by the original Political Bureau. There is also a Military Council, which is made up half of military commanders and half of civilian members of the Government Council, under a civilian chairman. During the advance of the Nationalist armies military affairs were, however, concentrated in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. Recently the Military Council has been recalled into existence.

In the circumstances of active civil war congresses of the Kuomintang cannot be frequent, and the last "Programme of the Kuomintang" was discussed, edited, and promulgated by a joint conference of the Central Executive Committee and "the executive members of various provincial and sectional Kuomintang organisations," held in October 1926. I asked what sort of temporary machinery they had for making laws, and was given the example of the new code of seventeen statutes dealing with counter-revolutionary offences, which was passed by a similar joint session of the Government Council with all available members of the Central Executive Committee. Provincial and municipal administrations also seem to have wide powers. Thus, the Bureau of Civil Administration of the municipality of Fatshan (a town of about 300,000 inhabitants near Canton) promulgated regulations prohibiting the buying or selling of slave girls (mercenary adoption),

and ordering the registration of those at present owned, with the object of gradually abolishing the institution altogether.

The organisation of the Nationalists is thus rather like that of the Communist party in Russia if it were without the adjunct of the Soviets, or that of the Fascist party in Italy if it were largely preoccupied with the curbing of any possible Mussolini. It is frankly a one-party Government, distinguished by being without the hope or the desire of permanence. It is an instrument for immediate needs, but in no way embodying even the moderate democratic ideals of the Kuomintang. Its chief weakness is the lack of means for maintaining wide and sensitive contact with the masses. Its present leaders admit this and point to the embryo of the organisation that is to replace it as supreme authority in the provincial " Unions of Workers, Merchants, Peasants, Students, and Members of the Liberal Professions." These are already influential and will, it is supposed, eventually become the foundations of Provincial Assemblies. Thus a provincial Administration for the province of Kiangsu was elected after the capture of Shanghai by the Nationalists, and included one representative of the Nationalist Government, three representatives of the Trade Union Council, one representative of the Communist party, two representatives of the Kuomintang, two representatives of the chambers of commerce, two representatives of the unions of shop proprietors, a representative of the Students' Union, and, as representative of the liberal professions, a journalist, that same Mr. Francis Zia who had so narrow

an escape of losing his head after being kidnapped in the International Settlement. This strange mixture is likely to be disturbed by internal squabbles, but its mere creation is a most significant thing. The Nationalists are extremely conscious that it is impossible to mould all China to one pattern. Provinces differ as much as countries in Europe and are frequently larger. Even in the past, large concessions have had to be made to local character and needs. The Nationalists say that there will have to be wide local autonomy under the Provincial Assemblies, which will themselves be represented in a National Assembly for the whole country. This, of course, is but the rather vague picture seen by the Nationalists when they look beyond their immediate difficulties. In the present, imperfect as their party government may seem to Western eyes, they point out that it represents an unprecedented real advance for China, in that it substitutes the will of a party with a political programme for the caprice of individual leaders without programme of any kind. I have talked to a great many opponents of the Nationalists in the north and elsewhere, and am convinced that whatever may happen to the Nationalists as individuals, or even to their Government, this idea of the advantage of party control and of party responsibility catches at the imagination even of their enemies and will survive.

PERSONALITIES OF THE HANKOW GOVERNMENT

"THAT little group at Hankow is held together simply by the English language," said a Chinese founding member of the Kuomintang. He referred to Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and the four first Ministers of the Nationalist Government, Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs; T. V. Soong, Minister for Finance; Sun Fo, Minister for Ways of Communication; and Hsu Chien, Minister of Justice. He might have included Borodin, the Russian adviser, for the language which Borodin talks to the Chinese is not Russian but English. That little group habitually talk English among themselves, since Chen knows very little Chinese, and the others, with the exception of Dr. Hsu, received English and American educations. Nor should we be in any way surprised at finding that the leaders of Chinese nationalism are the men who have been taught by the West. They are our own disciples. Our axioms are become for them new, glowing discoveries of truth. We should resent the spectacle of forty foreign ships of war anchored in the Thames without invitation from ourselves, or that of sandbags and barbed wire put up by the inhabitants of the Chinese quarter in an English city. We ought to be rather flattered than surprised that Western-educated Chinese have learnt something of this proud intolerance from ourselves.

Borodin will be the subject of a separate chapter in

this book. Eugene Chen will be the subject of another. But it will probably be useful to put together a few facts about the other more prominent figures at Hankow in order to make a little clearer the character of the Government they represent.

T. V. Soong is a very young man. He was born in 1891, and is an elder brother of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, Dr. Sun's widow. He was sent to America to study and is a graduate of an American university (either Harvard or Yale). A clean-shaven, active young man, with slightly tinted spectacles, very pleasant manners, and a rather engaging confidence. His critics say that he has a mind which "darts about a lot" but is without much ballast. When he returned from America to China he became private secretary to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The presence of his signature as witness on the document that is known as Dr. Sun's Testament has been of some help to his political career by making at least his name familiar to great numbers of the Chinese, who hear this testament read aloud on ceremonial occasions. Soong was one of the founders of the Central Bank of China at Canton and became its chief manager. He was responsible for many of the ingenious financial shifts by which the Nationalists kept themselves going in Canton and secured the necessary money for the northern expedition that brought them to the Yangtze Valley. He was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1925, and in the same year was appointed Minister of Finance. He was well aware, he told me, that extreme labour unrest was likely to alienate the merchants and bankers, on

whose support the Chinese revolution depended, but believed that this was a temporary thing, natural after long suppression, and that equilibrium would soon be reached. " The fundamental interests of the merchants and bankers, such as the pacification of the country, standardisation of taxes, elimination of the militarists, are entirely with the Nationalists." He looked beyond the immediate struggle with foreign privilege, and said to me: " Chinese industrial and commercial development will be very slow if it is without foreign capital, and we do not wish to destroy its confidence. All we want is that foreign capital shall limit its stake in the country to a financial one, and not use it to excuse unjustifiable political claims." He pointed out that his first act on coming to Hankow had been to recognise the loans of the previous Government and to issue bonds to cover those that were unsecured, thus averting a panic in the Chinese banks.

Sun Fo, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen by his first marriage, is, like many sons of famous fathers, an undistinguished personality, although decidedly intelligent. He is a clean-shaven, stout, youngish man, with a pronounced Roman nose and spectacles. He entertained me to a Chinese luncheon, which included bird's-nest soup, several strange vegetables, pigeons' eggs, scraps of chicken dipped in sauce, pheasants' livers, noodles (a sort of macaroni very difficult to eat with chopsticks), asparagus in oil with powdered chicken (also none too easy with chopsticks), sweet almond cream, mandarin oranges from Kwangtung, and other delicacies. This hospitality of his makes me reluctant to record that

his enemies claim that, after being Mayor of Canton, his circumstances were markedly bettered, and I hasten to add that they admit that during his term of office he did a very great deal to improve that city. He said the Nationalists were not thinking of repudiating past loans. He was very clearly conscious that the complete unification and pacification of China demanded a great development of her railway system. "Railways are absolutely essential to us, and we are planning to allocate a large share of Government revenue to that purpose as soon as we can free ourselves from the burden of having to use 85 per cent. of our revenue in fighting. There are two ways of building railways, by the use of Chinese and by the use of foreign capital. We wish to use both. We can afford but little ourselves. But we hope to be able to induce foreign capital to come in and build on terms good enough to satisfy it, but without allowing it to turn commercial and financial rights into political fetters for China. Once we are on a proper footing with foreigners we shall be able to deal with them and they with us with less mutual mistrust."

Mrs. Sun Yat-sen is a very charming young woman, an enthusiast, happier in devotion to her late husband's ideals than, for example, in unravelling a complicated political situation. I think of her less as a leader of the Chinese revolution than as the flame in a paper lantern carried at the head of the Nationalist procession. She is one of the three women in the Central Executive Committee. She is full of faith. "In ten years, perhaps, we shall be as far ahead of other nations as we are behind them now." "There are many hundreds

of years between us and our grandmothers." "It is only now that Chinese women are beginning to realise that they have any part in life beside that of being good mothers. . . . Women in China are not having to fight for their rights as in England and America. The men are thrusting rights upon them before Chinese women are ready to make use of them." She recently opened a Women's Political Training Institute in Hankow, when, among other things, she said that it was incongruous for women to be fighting oppression by men while at the same time they themselves oppressed members of their own sex, and continued with an appeal on behalf of slave-girls and working women. Mrs. Sun was born in Shanghai and educated in the Wesleyan College in Macon, Galveston, America, where she was known for extreme shyness, devotion to her studies, and the difficulty which she found in mathematics.

These three young people, together with the rather older Eugene Chen, make up the little English-speaking nucleus of the Hankow Government. They are, of course, held together as much by their close association with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as by the language which they use among themselves.

The dominant character in that Government, however, and the man to whom is very largely due its present estrangement from large sections of the Kuomintang, is Dr. Hsu Chien, the Minister of Justice, who is in every way a contrast to them. In the first place, he is an elderly man for a Chinese. In the second, he has behind him a distinguished career as a

scholar of the old regime, a student of Confucius whose hopes of official preferment depended on skilful handwriting and the production of a prize essay in the old Examination Hall. By those ancient tests Dr. Hsu Chien was something almost equivalent to a Senior Wrangler. Among these blithe young Westerners Hsu Chien has the double prestige of age and China. At Hankow, whereas the Foreign Office and the rooms of all the others are in the Concession quarter, the Ministry of Justice is far away in the Chinese town. Here is a different world. Thousands of blue-clad foot passengers jostle through the mud; coolies, carrying tremendous burdens hung from either end of long bamboos, trot, moaning and squeaking rhythmically; ricksha coolies clear a way for themselves and their passengers with shouts; motor-cars flying the white sun on the blue flag of the Government push, hooting, through the mob. Long bannerlike signs dangle in the wind or are slung across the street. Demonstrations go their way with banging cymbals and fluttering paper flags. Children swarm in the dust. Tame birds, apparently trained to make their voices heard above the hubbub, screech in their wicker cages. There is a smell of humanity, of dust, of decaying vegetables, of incense, of drains. In the middle of all this, among the tumbledown one-story houses, is a small block of flats, with two motor-cars backed on the pavement in front of it and a few lolling soldiers. This is the Ministry of Justice, and here I found Dr. Hsu Chien. At the top of the building, in a bare room with paper mottoes pasted by their corners to distempered walls, I found two soldiers

engaged in a friendly scuffle. They pulled themselves together, grinned sheepishly, asked for a card, patted a sofa to invite me to sit down, and presently brought tea and cigarettes. After a minute Dr. Hsu Chien came in with his son. Dr. Hsu Chien has a small head, very narrow from back to front, with easily wrinkled forehead. He talks English, but not easily, and preferred to let me say what I had to say to his son, who put it into Chinese. He then talked volubly, with quick movements of his hands and, now and then, thin, almost silent laughter. I should have liked to know what he said, but his son boiled it down into an answer which usually met not the question I had asked but some other. He was all the time watching for opportunities of insisting on Chinese sovereign rights, though I did not in any way question them. For example, asking about the character of the legal code, I was told " China will make her own laws. If the whole world think a law good and we do not, we shall not make it. If the whole world think a law bad and we think it good for China, we shall make it." I found it better not to ask questions but to suggest subjects. He said that they were using the old civil code with additions of their own, which were passed by a joint meeting of the Government Council and the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. There would eventually be a proper Legislative Assembly. Where Chinese law and foreign law were absolutely at variance, as, for example, with regard to marriage, they would devise a special code to meet the needs of foreigners. Hsu Chien said sensible things but seemed determined to find an aggressive

way of saying them. The impression he made upon me was that of a brilliant man with something seriously wrong with his brain. Here was a man whose prestige among his young companions was that of age and old China, but a man unbalanced, incalculable, obstinate, and dogmatic. Hsu Chien was born in 1872, was Attorney-General of the Peking Higher Court in 1907, and Vice-Minister of Justice in 1912. Early in 1916 he announced that he was intellectually converted to Christianity, but could not feel that he was converted in his heart so long as God could suffer the supremacy of Yuan Shih-kai in Peking. Yuan Shih-kai died suddenly, whereupon Hsu Chien immediately announced his conversion and joined the Christian Church. He then had dreams of a political use of Christianity for the salvation of China. He subsequently visited Russia and seems to have undergone a further conversion. Such a man is dangerous to any party he may support.

EUGENE CHEN

EUGENE CHEN is one of the most remarkable men in the small group of Kuomintang politicians who make up the Nationalist Government at Hankow. In China the air is thick with accusations of double-dealing, peculation, and personal ambition, but during the whole time I was there, though I spent most of that time in meeting people who were politically opposed to Chen, I never heard a single word against his character. The only accusation made against him was that he had had the misfortune to be born in Trinidad, and was consequently very ignorant of the Chinese language. He knows English, if anything, too well. After my first meeting with him, which lasted for four and a half hours, I left him with the sort of feeling a man might have if he had spent that time with his head under Niagara. He had talked for the whole of that time with a flow of words, of argument, of controlled passion that left me breathless and numb. But, with a courage that I think deserves recognition, I presented myself to him again and again, and in the course of many meetings learnt to respect him for something more than eloquence, to like him as a human being, and to admire the sincerity and skill that he was showing in dealing with a situation of extraordinary difficulty.

His is a specialised intelligence that will not serve him outside fairly narrow limits, but within those limits it is very fine indeed. He has much less fear of danger

to himself than of violating diplomatic precedent, a curious quality to discover in a revolutionary, but explicable, perhaps, by reference to his training, which was that of the law. He qualified as a solicitor in London. In 1912 he was legal adviser to the Ministry of Communications under the first Cabinet of the Republican regime. He edited and owned the *Peking Gazette*, and in May 1917 Japanese influence, or that of Chinese implicated in secret negotiations with the Japanese, procured his arrest for having exposed and denounced those negotiations in his paper. When released he went to Shanghai, and was in close touch with Dr. Sun Yat-sen after the forcible dissolution of Parliament in 1917. In the summer of 1918 he was chosen a member of a diplomatic mission of the Canton group to the United States.

His next important work was as a member of the Southern Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when he was the author of the memorandum setting forth the Chinese case for the revision of the treaties. He then visited London and travelled in Europe, returning to China in the summer of 1920. In 1924 he came with Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Peking. In 1925 he was editing the Kuomintang bi-lingual paper *Min Pao*, and in August of that year was kidnapped by Fengtien troops, narrowly escaped being shot at Tientsin, and was released by the flight of his captors on the arrival of Kuominchun troops in that city. He was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government in April 1926, came overland from Canton to Hankow with that Government after

the capture of Hankow, and at the time when I saw him was engaged in the negotiations with Mr. O'Malley that ended in the signing of the Hankow Agreement. He is a man of forty-nine, small and slight in build, with longish dark hair, a small black moustache, spectacles, and a quick, rather nervous manner. In talk his foreign origin is betrayed only by a slight eccentricity in the emphasis of syllables and perhaps by too great a liking for English words of Latin origin.

I shall best illustrate Chen's political attitude by printing bits taken from his various talks with me. I saw him first at the moment when America had made her suggestion about the neutralisation of the Shanghai area. Chen was indignant, not so much at the impracticability of the proposal as at " the contempt for democratic institutions " shown in America's method of putting it forward :—

> She made it, if you please, not to the Governments concerned but to Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek. In sending it to Chang Tso-lin perhaps the Americans were right, for there is no Government in Peking except little Wellington Koo masquerading. But we are a Government. Not one of our generals would assume the right to speak on foreign affairs, and there is not one of us who would not feel insulted at the idea that we served any individual instead of our party and the Government it has set up. The American message was, of course, forwarded at once from military headquarters to me.

He described the Peking Government as " fictitious because it was without any power not lent it by generals who would not dream of obeying it." On the question of simultaneous negotiations on the part of Great Britain

with both the Peking and the Hankow Governments, he said :—

That amounts to a scarcely screened attempt to divide China. While we were at Canton, in a corner of China, objective facts were against us. But now we are on the Yangtze, functioning as a national Government. No one who knows Peking supposes for a moment that there is a national Government there. If we admit the rightness of simultaneous negotiations we are admitting the possibility of the disruption of China, in which we do not believe. At the same time, negotiations with us are essential because it is only the knowledge that negotiations are proceeding that keeps anti-British feeling quiet.

On the question of anti-British feeling he said :—

Let me tell you that the letters of the Labour party have been of the greatest assistance in helping us to get into the minds of our supporters the idea that to be anti-Imperialist does not mean to be anti-British. We are against British institutions in China that are unjust to us, not against Englishmen as such in China or elsewhere. It is naturally difficult to get this point into people's minds. The Labour party's messages have greatly helped in elucidating this.

On the subject of Russia he said :—

Russia has no influence on our foreign policy. Russians do not understand England and never will. We owe the Russians a great deal. What they have given us is technique. Our struggle in China is one against feudalism. We tried to combat it with Parliamentary institutions, and they were a complete failure. What we are now trying to do is to substitute government by party for government by individual feudalists. That is a great step forward, and we have learnt from the Russians how to do it. One of the fundamental weaknesses of us Chinese is unwillingness to take responsibility. The system of party government we have adopted from the Russians frees each individual from too heavy a burden of responsibility by making him the unquestioning instrument of

the party. Each man is free to discuss until the party takes a decision. He is then bound to carry out that decision, and the responsibility for it is not his but that of the party as a whole. Parliamentary institutions did not work in China. We have proved that this method does. We do not want Mussolini government. We have had quite enough of it in every province in China. For the individual we substitute the party, and that idea is enough to enable us to bring China out of her feudal period, the last smouldering fires of which you can observe in Chang Tso-lin and similar war-lords.

On Communism and Labour unrest he said :—

In all this (referring to party government borrowed from the Russians) there is no Bolshevism whatsoever. I do not believe that the ideals of the Communists are realisable for some twenty thousand years, until man evolves into some new order of intelligence. People say : " If you are not Bolsheviks, why, then, do you not shoot down your Labour people ? " Of course we could shoot them down, but to do so would be to deprive Nationalist China of the great force of her working population, which is needed to carry her through to victory. We should be alienating the people, and our strength lies precisely in the people's trust in us. They know that we are doing our best for them. They will consequently do what we tell them. Peking can ask them nothing. Neutrality and hostile neutrality is the utmost that Feudal China can hope for from the people.

RUSSIA'S AIMS IN CHINA

THE idea that the Nationalist movement in China is something created by Russia with the object of damaging England is an idea with an object. It is sedulously propagated by those who think that their interests stand to suffer by the advance of the Nationalists and are anxious to give a dog a bad name and hang him. These people speculate upon the violent hostility to Russia of large sections of British opinion. They hope to enlist that hostility against China by falsely representing that it is possible to hit Russia by hitting China. Those Chinese war-lords who stand to lose by the Nationalist advance curry favour with England and disguise their own purely selfish motives by following the example of English and American business men, proclaiming that their warfare against the Nationalists is not inspired by a desire to retain their present powers of absorbing so much of the income of the country that even high civilian State officials are unable to obtain their salaries but by a desire to " fight Bolshevism." The propaganda of business men and war-lords, aided by that of embittered White Russian refugees, has obscured the real issue in China by continually directing foreign opinion away from that real issue to an extraordinary phantasmagoria in which a fabulously rich Russia pours millions of money into the coffers of the South, pays (in Russian roubles, which are useless in China) mobs of coolies to do desperate deeds, sends thousands of agents (miracu-

lously become Sinologues) throughout the country, supplies the officers for an army of half a million men, and holds in the hollow of its hand the leaders of a movement which impoverished countries like England and America have been unable to buy. This idea is dangerous because, as it is meant to do, it prepares the way for an unnecessary war. It is dangerous because it warps judgment on a matter of the gravest import. We are faced with a problem in China that affects our whole future in the East. And at this moment Russia, like a red-herring, is trailed across the scent.

It is urgently necessary to get clear ideas on two points : first on Russia's aims in China, and second on what she has been able to do here and how she has been able to do it. Let us examine these two points separately and in that order. Russia is an Asiatic as well as a European country. She is, thanks to certain of our politicians, kept constantly aware that there are groups, and powerful groups, in England who look forward to her destruction by military force. Poland is continually waving a sword, too heavy for that little country to carry alone, on Russia's Western frontiers. Russia seeks to ensure for herself at least peace in the East. She is at present at peace with Japan. Her best safeguard against possible Japanese hostilities would be a friendly China. These are motives that might be those of any ordinary State. But Russia is not an ordinary State. Her rulers look forward to a time in the distant future when their theories are to be more widely accepted than at present. They believe revolution is inevitable and desirable in other countries,

Now, revolution of the kind envisaged by the Russian Communists is not a thing that can be brought about by conspiracy or plot. It is something brought about by the desperation of enormous masses. A free and independent China would be an encouragement to India, and the Russians believe that we are incapable, by the nature of our social and economic structure, of meeting an awakening India otherwise than by force. They think, therefore, that sooner or later the visible development of the Eastern peoples will involve England in the sort of war that will divide England horizontally and produce a state of affairs in which the larger classes of our nation will find themselves in desperate opposition to the smaller. They therefore see in the development of national consciousness in the East the growth of a wedge which will in time split the British nation along the cracks already indicated by internal economic discord. This motive dictates precisely the same foreign policy in the East as that which is dictated by Russia's needs as a nation.

It may be said: "But all this corroborates what we have been told, that Russia is our enemy in the East." It may be, but because a man holds out a fist with a knuckle-duster on it there is no need for us to run our heads against it. We prove Russia right only by accepting the rôle for which she has cast us. Only Bolsheviks believe that that is inevitable. Only Bolsheviks, who have themselves changed much during the last ten years, believe that we cannot change. The evidence is against them, and it is likely that long before that crisis comes to which they look forward we shall

have changed so much that the crisis need not come at all. Sir Austen Chamberlain's policy in China to-day is not the policy that the Russians would have expected five years ago. There is no need whatever to assume that some immutable law will compel us to remain static in order at the appointed time to play the part the Russian Communists expect us to play.

But in order to understand Russia's action in China it is necessary to understand her diagnosis of the situation, whether we agree with it or not, and it is even more necessary not to get excited about it. That diagnosis makes it Russia's policy to help as far as she can in the development of a united China not subject to the caprice or ruined by the greed of military satraps. She need look no farther, and does look no farther. The notion that Russia will do all she can now to prevent peaceful agreement between ourselves and the South is demonstrably idiotic. It was not Russia's own policy as a weak republic to invite quarrels with nations more powerful than herself. On the contrary, Russian policy has been consistent in refusing challenge after challenge. Hoping that the Chinese Nationalists will some day control China, Russia would be mad if, for the sake of pleasing a few Conservative die-hards in England, she urged the Nationalists, while engaged in a struggle with war-lords much better equipped in a military sense than themselves, to take on at the same time a war with England. It was assumed in the English Press that Borodin, the Russian adviser in Hankow, opposed the signing of the Hankow Agreement. I have the best of reasons for knowing that such

influence on foreign policy as he had was used in the opposite direction. Similarly, after the Shameen shooting at Canton he threw such weight as he had into the scale against the youthful military enthusiasts who wanted immediately after the shooting to take Shameen by force. He told them that they had not yet made sure of a province of China, and asked them if they thought it would be easier to conquer Great Britain.

What, precisely, has Russia done in furthering the movement of the Chinese Nationalists? All that she could. I do not believe that she has given them much help in the way of money, for the simple reason that she has not got much to give. Also, if, as some fanatics allege, Russia financed the northern expedition of the Nationalists, they would not have had to take the risks they have taken of causing discontent in the territory they already held by squeezing out of it the funds for that purpose. Finally, the bitterest critics of the Russian influence among the Nationalists are those Nationalists who have in controversy on that very point lost their positions in the party. These men do not allege that Russia contributed money, but do say that she contributed some of the arms and ammunition, of which great quantities were left in Russia after the failure of foreign intervention. This she could well afford to do, though she would have found it difficult to transport any very large amounts. Russia's main contribution to the success of the Nationalists has been one of ideas and of methods. She has done this without the need of a non-existent army of expensive agents.

Her most obvious contribution of this kind has been

the putting at the disposal of the Chinese Nationalists experience gained in the Russian civil wars in organising an army whose allegiance was less to an individual general than to an idea. The Russians have helped the Nationalists to organise a revolutionary as distinguished from a purely mercenary or purely feudal army. It is perhaps fortunate for the Nationalists that Sun Yat-sen failed in his attempt to get English and American instructors for that army and was forced to turn to Russia.[1] It is unlikely that English or American instructors would have kept their minds concentrated on the story of the formation of Cromwell's Ironsides or the armies of American Independence. They would have been thinking of trench mortars and such things, whereas more important than ammunition in a civil war is the consciously revolutionary character of the army. The Russian instructors were fresh from experience of just such a war, and they taught the Chinese the methods whereby they had themselves beaten, in Denikin and Kolchak, the Russian equivalents of the

[1] A Chinese who had been for many years a friend of Sun Yat-sen was with him when he made up his mind to turn to the Russians for help. He was opposed to this, and said so. This, word for word, was Dr. Sun's reply, as it was reported to me in Peking by the man to whom he made it. "The republic is my child. It is in danger of drowning. I am trying to keep it afloat and we are being swept down the river. I call for help to England and America. They stand on the bank and jeer at me. There comes a Russian straw. Drowning, I clutch at it. England and America, on the bank, shout at me on no account to clutch that Russian straw. But do they help me? No. They jeer themselves and at the same time tell me not to clutch that Russian straw. I know it is a straw, but better that than nothing."

picturesque Chinese war-lords. A large number of instructors was not necessary for this. Canton contented itself with forty. Russia was rightly very much afraid lest the presence of these men should lead to jealous murmurings that Russia was forcing her own dominance in China and that an anti-Russian feeling should be created accordingly. These forty officers, who were for the most part officers of the Red army demobilised after the general reduction in that army after the end of the civil war, had to resign all connection with the Russian Army and to claim no special privileges in China. Each man was individually employed in the Southern army with a salary one grade lower than that of the Chinese officer to whom he was attached. He had to salute Chinese officers of rank superior to his own, get, or fail to get, his pay like any Chinese officer, and might not travel in carriages reserved for officers of higher rank than his own. Very few of the forty were members of the Communist party, and, indeed, two of them were old officers of the Imperial army who had been in China during and after the Great War and had not returned to Russia at all, though they were now hoping to do so. Of this original forty, one got consumption, several resigned their jobs and went home, several suffered during the recent campaign, and there are now between twenty-five and thirty-five, together with a certain number of interpreters, of whom some are Chinese, some Korean, and the rest Russians from Manchuria who know Chinese. A greater number were not needed, or they would, no doubt, have been found. Even this small number is

likely to decrease as more and more young Chinese officers trained in the Cantonese Political and Military Academy are able to replace them. Nothing is more likely to weaken Russian influence than the obvious presence of Russians, and from the Russian point of view the sooner these instructors can be removed as unnecessary the better.

The Russian officer of whom most is heard is General Galin. He was not one of the forty instructors, but was invited to China by General Chiang Kai-shek. Galin is the *nom de guerre* of a man who, though a Russian subject, comes of German parentage. He served with the Red army throughout the civil war, and after the war was over found himself at Vladivostok. In 1923 General Chiang Kai-shek went to Moscow to study for himself the organisation and training of the Red army and the methods of the Russian General Staff College. On his way back to China he met and liked Galin. When, in 1924, he started the Whampoo Military Academy (now " Political and Military "), he asked if it would not be possible to find this particular young officer, with whom he had had interesting conversations in Vladivostok. Galin was invited to come to work in the Academy. He came, but did not like the tropical climate of Canton, and presently threw up his job and went north again. After some months Chiang Kai-shek held out various inducements to him and Galin returned. He is held to be a very clever strategist, and is greatly valued in the Southern army. His position there is entirely a personal matter between himself and Chiang Kai-shek.

That exhausts the Russian military assistance to the Southerners. It would be surprising if there were more of it, and the same results might very likely have been achieved with an even smaller number of men. It would be of no importance if it were not that it allows fanatics to spill a lot of wild talk about the Russian-officered Southern army. They attribute importance to this small Russian contribution because it is the only sort of assistance that they themselves are capable of understanding. The really important Russian contribution towards the success of the Nationalists is of quite another kind, and will be discussed separately in a chapter on Borodin.

BORODIN

FORTY instructors were enough, and more than enough, to teach the Cantonese what the Russians had learnt by hard experience of the making of a new army, of dealing with relics of an old army, of the things that matter and the things that do not matter in fighting a civil war. Observers with military minds say that the Russians taught the Cantonese how, out of the worst material in China, to make the best army. They are inclined to think that this has been Russia's greatest contribution to the cause of the Nationalists. I disagree with them. Far less than forty instructors were necessary to teach the Cantonese the one skill that distinguishes them from all other factions now fighting in China—that of organisation first of a party and secondly of a revolutionary movement of which that party naturally and without question became the General Staff. That contribution was far more important than the remaking of their army, and for it one man was enough ; that man was Borodin.

I do not think that Borodin himself would claim any special gifts or the commanding personality attributed to him by those who do not understand that what was important was not the man but the things he had to say. Borodin may be properly considered as a good gramophone. He was important because the sole record that was sent with him was precisely the record that the Cantonese, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen in particular, needed to hear. That record is rather over twenty years'

experience of the growth and struggles of the Bolshevik party in Russia. Communism was neither here nor there. The Chinese Communist party was, like the British, a natural reflection of the Russian revolution. As Lenin himself had pointed out, China has to develop as a capitalist country before any of the specifically Communist slogans have any practical meaning there. Here in China it was not a question of setting up " a workers' and peasants' Government." China was not yet ruled by her business men, but by a number of mutually independent generals. The interests of business men and labourers alike were thus on main issues identical. China was on the threshold of great industrial and commercial progress (this point is continually forgotten by observers on the spot, although it is made clear enough by, for example, the increasing prosperity of the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank, which has not been interrupted even by the last year of turmoil), and her immediate business was the shrugging off of such obstacles to that progress as rule by irresponsible warlords on the one hand and limitations imposed by the foreigner on the other. The Communist in China looks to a very distant horizon, on reaching which his particular doctrines will begin to find material expression. It is consequently not surprising that in China a Communist, Borodin, can give excellent practical advice to a movement which for a long time to come must have aims of a purely " bourgeois " character. Borodin had to teach a bourgeois revolution the methods of revolution in general as tested in practice during the last quarter of a century in Russia.

Borodin is perfectly conscious of the nature of his task :—

The only Communism possible in China to-day (he says) is the Communism of poverty, a lot of people eating rice with chopsticks out of an almost empty bowl.

Again :—

At present and for many years to come Communists and capitalists alike in China must have the same ideal of a prosperous and much more highly developed industrial China and a general rise in Chinese standards of living. China is neither the producer nor the consumer that she could be.

The Chinese Nationalists want an agrarian revolution, but they want it in order to clear the way for China's capitalist development.

Intellectuals used to think that by reminding the world of China's long civilised history they would get her her place in the family of nations. China has learnt, since Versailles, that that family tolerates no poor relations, even with 4,000 years of a respectable past.

Borodin is a stoutly built man of forty, with a good deal of humour, an excellent knowledge of English (the language through which he communicates with the Chinese), a downright manner of talking, and, when he talks of the Chinese, very much the attitude of mixed admiration, laughter, and annoyance which in the course of years seems to become that of most foreigners who have much to do with them. On the subject of the outcry made about him in particular he says :—

What is all the fuss about ? The institution of advisership in China is a very old one. There are plenty of foreign advisers in Peking who get their cheques whether the Chinese officials are paid or not. The only difference seems to be that I do some pretty hard work and the others do not. I

do not go in for horse-racing, and, instead of writing regretful memoirs about the intrigues of the late Dowager-Empress, am making a serious study of economic China at the present day. I have just finished a book on the Chinese agrarian movement of 800 closely printed pages. In the old days England supplied China with advisers who devoted themselves to Chinese interests, and consular officials (Meadows, for example) who made valuable studies instead of drifting through club bars and round racing meetings. It is not my fault, nor Russia's fault, that England did not help Sun Yat-sen. There was Sun expecting, with his boundless good faith, that the countries which had taught him his Utopian ideas of democracy would lend him a helping hand. They called him a lunatic. Well, I came to Canton on a voyage of discovery and found Dr. Sun Yat-sen in very great difficulties, surrounded by enemies and struggling to keep up a semblance of government. I took off my coat and settled down to help him in that horrible tropical climate, with insects of a size and ferocity I had never known in Russia, no snow, no winter, and the sweat dripping on my papers. Horrible it was, loathsome, and now that Dr. Sun is being proved to have been not such a lunatic after all, you people turn round and curse me for doing what you might have done yourselves. It is not what you can call sportsmanlike.

Borodin was responsible for three decisive changes in Sun Yat-sen's tactics. He handed on to Dr. Sun the lessons taught by Lenin, of which the first was that a doubtful ally is a source of weakness rather than of strength. When Borodin went to Canton, Sun Yat-sen was keeping up his " semblance of government " in the face of difficulties set up not by his enemies but by his allies. He made these doubtful allies his enemies, made a clear issue of it, and, after many vicissitudes, beat them, with the result that his government ceased to be a semblance but became a reality within a limited area.

The second contribution which Russia, through Borodin, made to the Chinese Revolution was the idea of government by party and the organising of a party for the special purpose of governing. The whole of the organisation of the Kuomintang, when it was revised after Borodin's arrival, was based on that of the Bolshevik party in Russia. It became an organisation that combined highly centralised direction with activity of the rank and file and substituted party responsibility for that of the individual.

Russia's third contribution was to teach the Kuomintang how to turn Dr. Sun's pious programme of a raised standard of living for the workers into a stout weapon of offence and defence. Borodin may be said to have taught Dr. Sun to rely on classes rather than on individuals, after having taught him to rely on a party instead of on himself. Borodin could show how the revolution of 1905 in Russia was brought about by the workmen of the capital for the benefit of the Russian bourgeoisie. He could show how agrarian revolution in France for the immediate benefit of the French small farmers crushed the French feudal lords for the benefit of the French bourgeoisie. The bringing into active political strife of the Kwangtung peasants was the factor that brought about the eventual unification of Kwangtung province. The bringing into active political strife of the Cantonese workmen was the factor that for a long time fortified the Government against assault from within. And these two factors, far more than military efficiency, were the cause of the comparatively easy Cantonese advance to the Yangtze River. These

are dangerous weapons, but no other could have brought about the result achieved. In bringing these weapons into active operation the obvious agents to use were the Chinese Communists, and on them will fall the heaviest blows if and when the Chinese Revolution finds it necessary to blunt them.

* * * * *

The question of whether or no Borodin receives orders (and a salary) from the Soviet Government in Moscow seems to me completely unimportant, since the members of that Government and Borodin are all members of the Communist party and alike subject to the directions of its Central Committee.

LABOUR AND THE KUOMINTANG

BUSINESS people in China are inclined to identify the Nationalist Government with Chinese labour. They say that, whereas under the old regime everybody was happy and contented, including, of course, themselves, the rise of the Nationalist Government has brought with it a distressing compulsory revolt of the wage-earners, who were once very content to take whatever was given them. It is true that labour unrest does accompany the advance of the Nationalists and that the appearance of it is usually a symptom of their further advance. It is worth while to examine the relation between labour and the Kuomintang. It is probable that there is not a labour union in China whose leaders would not describe themselves as Kuomintang men, even if they could not produce their cards of membership of the party. This is in no way surprising. Long ago Sun Yat-sen prophesied that there would be a close connection between the struggle for national enfranchisement and that for individual freedom. Labour and Kuomintang politicians alike point out that the nation-wide movement against "Imperialism" was largely produced by the events of May 30th in Shanghai, which began with labour strikes; and similarly the Northern military expedition of the Nationalists, which is fundamentally a struggle for the unification and liberation of China, brought with it freedom and power to the labour movement in Central and Southern

China. The two things quite obviously help each other. Labour unions flourish under the Nationalist Government, which, by removing the militarists, puts a stop to the forcible suppression of the extremely primitive Chinese trade unions. Masses who cannot be expected to be deeply interested in the question whether the army is to be controlled by civil authority or not are given in this way a positive interest in the downfall of the militarist. For example, at Hankow, after the defeat of Wu Pei-fu, the wages of the coolies rose from 6s. a month to 14s., after being practically stationary for eight years. The news of this naturally spreads down the river, and coolies in ports still held by Wu Pei-fus of one complexion or another are led to look forward to a taste of the millennium when the Nationalist troops shall arrive. The Nationalist Government, on the other hand, also gains by getting just that revolutionary reputation which in civil war is worth a good many tanks and aeroplanes. At the same time it should be noticed that care has been taken to keep the labour unions separate from the Government organisation. There is no official in the Government who can be said to be responsible for the unions. If and when the Government finds it necessary to curb trade-union activities, it will not be faced with the prospect of a struggle within itself. A Labour Minister is about to be appointed. He will not be a tool of the trade unions, but a mediator between the Government and labour.

While in Hankow I visited the Hupeh Province Federation of Labour. I found there men whose

attitude seemed to be that of English trade unionists of twenty years ago. They were keenly interested in raising the standard of living of the workers, but had no idea of using their demands to force the kind of revolution that has taken place in Russia. While very conscious that only the arrival of the Nationalists had made possible the legal existence of the Federation, and while supporting the Kuomintang programme for China, their chief interest was one of wages and hours. They very hotly denied that the Labour demands were unreasonable. Wages, they said, had remained stationary for a very long time, while the price of living had gone up nearly 300 per cent. Yet in general the increases now obtained averaged an advance of $3 a month on a wage of $12 per month (a dollar is approximately 2s.). I particularly inquired about the wages of the textile workers. These men said that the average wage before the arrival of the Nationalist Government had been 35 cents a day. It was now 48 cents. The lowest wages (for children and women) had been as low as 12 cents a day. They were now 20 cents. The highest had been 75 cents a day. They were now 90 cents. These changes applied to all six factories in Hupeh, of which five were Chinese and one Japanese. There can be no question but that labour conditions in China were extremely bad, that the rising cost of living had made them worse, and that even the largest increases that have been obtained do not bring the standard of life of a Chinese worker anywhere near that of a European. It was established by a Government Commission that a workman, his wife,

and two children could live comparatively comfortably in Wuchang on $27.46 a month (without buying meat, medicine, and other luxuries). Skilled labourers were earning $16 per month, unskilled $10 per month, and a great many unfortunates as little as $3. In the factories the hours of work were twelve in the day, and there were seven days in the week. The Sunday holiday is one of the scandalous innovations of the Cantonese. In home industries and in shops people were working as many as sixteen hours a day. These are not defensible conditions, and it is impossible to be surprised that the pot should boil over the moment the militarist is lifted from the lid.

As to the extent of unionism in China, it is extremely difficult to get exact figures. The Chinese, almost without exception, seem to think that final noughts are of no particular importance. In their talk, a thousand, ten thousand, a million, or a billion all mean that a number is very large, but no more. At the same time I am inclined to think that the following figures are somewhere near the truth. In all, so far, 1,000,000 to 1,300,000 labourers are trade unionists. There are some 20,000 railway workers. The bulk of the unions are small craft unions of the most primitive kind. The main mass of industrial workers are in districts still under Northern control. In Shanghai, where active trade-unionism has been known for some time, there has been recently some wholesale knocking off of trade unionists' heads. In the provinces controlled by the Nationalists union figures are said to be as follows :—

Kwantung	250,000
Kwangsi	30,000
Hupeh	340,000
Hunan	320,000
Kiangsi	50,000

There are known to be 80,000 in Shanghai, but a large number seem on occasion to obey the orders of union leaders. In Tientsin there are 10,000. I have been unable to get any account of the organisations in provinces still controlled by the militarists, such as Shantung and Honan, where such labour organisation as exists is illegal and therefore secret.

It is wrong to say that the Labour movement is dominated by the Chinese Communists. It is true that such Communists as there are naturally gravitate towards the labour unions, but in the first place there are very few of them; in the second, they are subject to the Kuomintang, having themselves decided that during the present period Kuomintang directives shall be binding upon them; in the third, they are under no illusions as to the proximity of a Bolshevik revolution in China. What Lenin said is for them revealed truth, and Lenin looked forward to a time when China should have many Shanghais of her own, and saw as a preliminary stage of the way to Bolshevism in China "a colossal development of capitalism." Dr. Sun Yat-sen, also their prophet, said: "In China what is called inequality between poor and rich is only a distinction between the very poor and the less poor," and, again: "Until industries are developed in China the Marxian

theory of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship cannot be applied." The acceptance of this programme, these dogmas, by the Chinese Communists makes Communist propaganda in China very unlike that propaganda in the highly developed industrial countries of Europe. For many years to come there will be little whereby the Communist programme for China can be distinguished from that of the most sober-minded bourgeois.

This, however, does not mean that it is certain that there will be no clash in the fairly immediate future between the Kuomintang and its smaller Communist section. The new activities of labour, the new uncertainty of the wage factor, is most upsetting to business. Chinese firms, working on a narrower margin, suffer more than the Europeans. The Nationalist Government is already aware that labour is creating enemies for it among the very classes from which it seeks its chief financial support. Already it is meeting them by setting up arbitration courts, which at present lack men with the character to stand up to any unreasonable mass demands. Already, with the object of preventing such extravagant demands being made in Shanghai on its arrival as were made in Hankow, it has been trying in advance to draw up a scale of fair wages, with the hope that the unions will be guided by this scale to use a moderation that will calm the fears of business men. I imagine that when the inevitable trial of strength comes between the essentially bourgeois Nationalists and the labour unions, the Communists will leave the Kuomintang in order to have a free hand in leading

the latter. The unions will be seeking for leaders among those not bound to accept the orders of the party that directs the Government. In order to be such leaders the Communists will be compelled to cut adrift.

THE PEASANTS AND THE KUOMINTANG

MUCH is heard about labour unrest in China, because the formation of trade unions and demands for increases in wages affect the foreigner who employs Chinese labour. We hear less about relations between the revolution and the peasants, because the foreigner is not seriously interested in Chinese agriculture and does not invest his money in it. When we do hear anything about the peasants it is usually an inaccurate statement either that Chinese peasants hold their land on a communal system or that they are all small-holders vitally interested in the avoidance of any kind of change. We do not hear the Kuomintang view of the peasants, which is extremely interesting, not so much because of the light that it throws on the peasants but because it is a valuable piece of evidence in determining the character of the revolution, a thing which can never be learnt from its banners and only with difficulty from a critical study of its enemies.

Sun Yat-sen, after studying the Russian revolution, came to the conclusion that the reason why the Chinese nationalist revolution had failed was that it had sought support from too small a class. It had attempted to be a revolution from the top, and instead of enlisting the masses, like the revolutions of France and Russia, it had tried to further its ends by conspiracy and arrangements between individuals (to which policy it still has a tendency to revert). He had always had a

programme that included a good deal of rather vague social reform, but it had not at first occurred to him to enlist, in securing the possibility of such reforms, the people whom he intended to benefit by them. This change of attitude on his part may well come to seem the most important of the Russian revolution's contributions to the Chinese. It was realised that if the Chinese revolution was to have a secure foundation it must combine with its nationalism something that would arouse the enthusiasm of the town workers and the support of the peasants, who make up about three-quarters of the Chinese population. The townsmen, business people, merchants, manufacturers, were all with Sun Yat-sen when he held out hopes of the future industrial development of China. Their hesitation over the prospect of raising their employees' wages was temporarily silenced by the visible access of strength that the revolution gained from labour support. It was necessary to find a formula that would reconcile them to agrarian changes. Kuomintang speakers began to refer to China's need of a better internal market. Foreign markets were in the hands of countries with which for a long time China would not be able to compete. There remained the Chinese market, which, though large from the point of view of numbers, was poor in purchasing power. The buying powers of the peasants were to be increased by a solution of the land question.

Now in China, as it was presently pointed out, there are few great landowners, so that an agrarian revolution like the French or the Russian was altogether out of the

question. But there could be no denying that the peasant population as a whole was miserably poor. Actually, in China, money is not as a rule profitably invested in land. While landowners tend to multiply, the size of their holdings tends to grow smaller, largely on account of the law of inheritance, which makes all a man's male relatives his heirs. A holding of eight to eighty acres by a family of five or six persons is counted wealth. By altering the law of inheritance, the Kuomintang show a decidedly non-Communist inclination to arrest the subdivision of holdings and to bring about the growth of a yeoman class. But it appears from investigations by the Peking Ministry of Trade and Agriculture that about half the Chinese peasantry have insufficient land to support life. A great many families have holdings of less than two acres, on which they cannot grow enough to feed themselves. Thus about half the peasantry have to rent the land on which they work. In Kwantung province, according to Kuomintang writers, 80 per cent. of the peasants have to rent their land. Rent is paid in money and in kind, and is said to be seldom less than half the crop. There is also in use an extremely bad system whereby a company rents land wholesale and sublets to the small farmer, who has to pay a rent very considerably larger than that received by the actual owner of the land. On the basis of some such summary of the position the Kuomintang developed its agrarian programme, which is a modest affair in comparison with the general expropriation of landlords carried out in other revolutions, but illustrates very well the unwillingness of Chinese revolutionaries

to tamper with property rights, no matter how severely they may lay property-owners under contribution when they need money to finance a campaign.

The chief article of that programme is a reduction of rent on agricultural land by 25 per cent. Rent is not to be collected in advance, and is not to be paid in time of famine, the effects of which are to be shared between landowner and farmer instead of being borne exclusively by the latter. There is to be a uniform system of land taxation. Taxes are not to be collected in advance. Provincial public lands are to be made a land fund for farmers' banks, which are to be established to lend money to farmers at 5 per cent. The maximum rate of interest is not to exceed 20 per cent. (a provision which throws some light on the present relations of peasants and money-lenders). Undeveloped lands belonging to the provincial Governments are to be distributed among the poorer peasants. The tenant contract system referred to above is to be prohibited. These are the main provisions of the Kuomintang agrarian programme. They are enough to arouse the half-incredulous support of the peasants, who are in any case ready enough to follow the suggestions of clause 84 of the programme, "Peasants shall have the right to form peasant unions," and of clause 86, "Peasant unions have the right to form volunteer corps for self-defence." By the forming of these unions and these defence corps, the peasants are brought into active support of the Kuomintang and come to be of scarcely less importance than the regular troops in the campaign of the Kuomintang against the relics of the old regime, represented by the Northern militarists.

The first peasant union was organised in Haifung, in the province of Kwangtung, in January 1923, when Sun Yat-sen had but an uncertain hold on Canton. It could soon count as many as 100,000 members. I was informed at Hankow that there are now in Kwangtung 800,000, in Hunan 2,000,000, and in Hupeh 500,000 organised peasants, these being the provinces in which the rule of the Kuomintang is most assured. My informants considered that as each member of the peasant union probably represented a family of five, they could therefore hold that the peasant unions of these provinces represented seventeen and a half million peasants. This is probably not much more inaccurate than most estimates of the Chinese population, which are obtained in much the same way. There are also peasant unions in the provinces held by the militarists, which, if the present schism in the Kuomintang does not make it incapable of further advance, will presently be very useful to the Nationalists.

It is extremely difficult to accompany these bare statistics and programmes with any clear picture of what the formation of peasant unions actually means. In the hope of doing this, at least for myself, I have gone carefully through two large volumes of resolutions and reports concerned with the peasant movement during the long struggle of the Kuomintang to make its position secure in Kwangtung. The first impression such a reading produces is of a horrible mêlée, so involved that it is almost impossible to distinguish the fighters and to decide who is on either side. The formation, even the suggestion of the formation, of peasant unions stirred

to activity everybody who considered that such unions might be a threat to his own interests. Landowners, small though they might be, combined at once in face of the danger of their tenants getting out of hand. Bandits, who foresaw the end of their world if the villages should begin to combine against them, made common cause with the landowners, who in terror of ills they scarcely knew made terms eagerly with those with which they were familiar. Even the militia, a sort of police, conceived quite rightly that development of the peasant unions would make much more difficult those kinds of extortion on which they depended for their luxuries and probably in many cases for the necessaries of life. In the course of these reports it frequently appears that the peasant unions were engaged in a desperate struggle with bandits, militia, and soldiers, allied together and financed by " landlords and depraved gentry," while the Kuomintang headquarters were being bombarded with applications for assistance against the peasants from the militia and against the militia from the peasants.

These peasant unions were not spontaneous organisations, but they were not difficult to start. The peasants had for many years been having a very bad time, and listened eagerly to the Kuomintang members who urged them to unite in defence of their own interests. The founders of unions seem for the most part to have been, not desperate peasants, but schoolboys and students who had thrown their books and scholastic careers to the winds and themselves into a game more consistently exciting than football, and taken by youthful Chinese with no less seriousness than games are taken

by the youthful Briton. I have before me a report from some of these young men who, after showing the police a letter from the authorities in Canton introducing them to the local magistrate, set about forming a peasant union. Their "slogans" were "to oppose foreigners, to oppose corrupt soldiers, to oppose lawless landlords, to oppose wicked gentry, to guard against native bandits, and to urge all peasants to unite." Their programme, itself extremely symptomatic, was: "(1) Lecture on market days; (2) preach in each village; (3) interview at each house." When they had got enough members to form a union they wished to register it, and two of them, Woo and Chow, went to see the local magistrate, Mr. Li, who was just sitting down to play Mah Jong with the "gentry" of the village council and other officers. Supper was announced, and Mr. Li invited the young men to dine with him. At dinner he said to Chow, "You have just graduated from the Industrial School. You should enter upon a higher course of study. Why do you engage yourself in such work? You are indeed officious." "Since Chow knew that magistrate Li was a conservative old fellow, he did not feel it unusual that he did not understand the importance of the newly-promoted peasant movement." He accordingly harangued the magistrate, who, presently, "looked rather angry, striking the ground with his long tobacco-pipe. The corrupt gentry and officers who were playing Mah Jong with him all smiled at his actions." It is not difficult to read between the lines and to observe that scene with other eyes than those of the enthusiastic boy who made the report.

That these lads had ripe material with which to work is proved by the existence in many parts of China of peasant organisations of another kind which had not needed the kindling spark of district-visiting and market-day lectures by young intellectuals. Driven by nothing less than desperation, the peasants in many parts of the country had themselves formed bodies of " Red Spears," " Heavenly Doormen," " Stiff Stomachs," etc., with the object of defending the country-side against soldiers and bandits alike. These movements are as spontaneous as those of the Middle Ages. Their leaders are probably without political programme, but in practice are strictly territorial, defending their own districts from all outside interference whatever. They are often jealous of the peasant unions, which seek to absorb their members and bring them under the political hegemony of the Kuomintang. They have again and again defeated the regular troops of the North and suffered terribly from subsequent punitive expeditions. To them more than to anyone else was due, for example, the costliness of the Northern advance into Honan in the beginning of this year.

KIUKIANG

KIUKIANG, *February* 24, 1927.

ON the way down river from Hankow I reached Kiukiang before dark, when some members of the Kiukiang municipality came on board and invited me to dinner on the *Kiangwo* to hear their point of view. I was told that no Britishers were living ashore, but while going in the launch to the *Kiangwo* I said I would like to have a look at the Concession. They very kindly took me around it. The first thing that I noticed was that, though it was considered unsafe for foreigners to live ashore, our party were everywhere respectfully saluted by the Chinese police. Our guides said regretfully that most of the looting had been cleared up, but they had been able to preserve two specimen rooms. These rooms had been sealed, and the seals had been broken only the day before to show Mr. O'Malley when he came down the river. These rooms were in the China Inland Mission. The looting seemed to me to have been very inefficient: floors covered with torn-up papers which must have been left by foreigners while preparing to leave; corners of sofas and mattresses ripped up, the sort of places in which Chinese would expect people to hide their money. Very little furniture was broken and no windows, not even a very ugly ostentatious hanging-lamp which I should have liked to smash myself. We walked all round the little Concession, and afterwards went off to its floating

substitute, the *Kiangwo*, where we dined. Afterwards, with the help of eye-witnesses, I compiled the following diary of events of Kiukiang.

November 4, 1926.

The Northern troops in the district collapsed. The first news of a coming change was the sight of flying Northerners seeking sanctuary in the Concession, some swimming the creek. They threw away their rifles, their coats, and in some instances took off everything, and on going into the Concession ran on completely naked, and kept on running until they dropped, pursued by the Concession policemen, shocked by this offence against the public decency.

On this day the ships put landing parties ashore. The Americans were first, followed half an hour later by British, French, and Japanese. After a few days all the landing parties were withdrawn except the British, who lived in the Municipal Buildings and had their own cookhouse ashore. Barricades were put up of sandbags (already prepared) and barbed-wire entanglements. Trenches were dug, and during the next three weeks or so these defences were steadily improved. Of the four gates of the Concession (see plan on next page) two were kept closed—the one on the Bund close by the Customhouse, which is inside the Concession, and the one on the creek. This was done in order to make it easier to control the influx of Northern soldiers, who in their frantic haste to get away were swarming on to the hulks in greater numbers than the steamers which were taking them down river could accommodate. It was

arranged with the Southerners that when a steamer had room for a certain number of defeated Northerners the authorities should be informed, after which that



quantity of Northerners should be let through. What happened was that if 100 were to go the Southerners would round up about 50, and another 350 would collect

independently and all try to crowd through together. Closing the gates made the business of control much easier.

January 3, 1927.

The Customs seized some smuggled charcoal on a junk. A row began between Customs coolies and coolies who sympathised with the smugglers. Some of these were on one side of our barbed wire and some on the other, so that, without wishing it, we were impeding a private Chinese fight. The sailors on shore then tried to disperse the crowd, whereupon apparently both parties of coolies dropped their private squabble and began to throw stones at the sailors. The Consul asked the Chinese authorities for assistance and Chinese military police cleared up the trouble. This row lasted two hours in all.

January 4th.

News of the riot at Hankow reached Kiukiang. At nine o'clock in the morning the steamer *Tuckwo* came in from Hankow, and her captain (Captain Campbell) on his own initiative suggested waiting a day in case evacuation should seem necessary, because they had room for 100 passengers. The Consul wired to Rear-Admiral Cameron on the *Bee* at Hankow, who concurred, and that night the British women and children were evacuated, with their baggage.

January 6th.

Trouble began owing to the Russian wife of the harbour-master, who suddenly decided to evacuate,

and did so at 2 p.m.—that is to say, in broad daylight—using Customs coolies to carry her luggage down to the Customs sampan. Other coolies, conceiving that they were being done out of a job (most of the minor rows begin owing to coolies squabbling over baggage-shifting), attacked them. Two English Customs officials were accompanying the Customs coolies. These joined in the fray, and a non-Customs coolie knocked down one of them, fell on the top of him, grappled him, and tried to eat his cheek. The other Englishman smote the coolie a blow with a truncheon, whereupon the coolie, with great presence of mind, immediately pretended to be dead. By this time there was a big crowd on the foreshore of the Bund, and the Englishmen were rescued by the sailors and members of the Kiukiang Defence Force, armed with the handles of trenching tools.

At this point H.M.S. *Wyvern*, off Butterfield and Swire's hulk, let off two maroons. These rockets arrested the attention of all the Chinese, and the two explosions cleared the Bund in a few seconds, the Chinese thinking that firing had begun. They all rushed out of the Concession, energetically but peaceably encouraged to do so by the Kiukiang Defence Force. In three minutes the Concession was empty. When the panic subsided and the Chinese realised that they had been running away from nothing but fireworks, a large crowd collected again outside the barbed wire ; a few were inside examining the " dead man." This man, I was told, was subsequently examined at the hospital and found to be suffering from nothing but a bruise. He may, however, have been stunned.

In any case, he was the only Chinese who did not run away from the rockets. The gates of the Concession were now closed, and while they were being closed two Chinese soldiers, who were being shut out, fired two shots through them that did no damage. The attitude of the crowd became extremely threatening. At 4 p.m. T. V. Soong, the Nationalist Minister of Finance, who happened to be there on business, seeing the danger, ordered General Ho to bring troops in. General Ho promised there should be no more trouble, and left a number of military police, who are generally said to have behaved very well. The crowd had beaten down the barbed wire, and came about one hundred yards into the Concession, where the Chinese military police held them with drawn pistols, but without firing. The British sailors were drawn up at some little distance along the Bund. After dark the crowd removed the Bund gate. The other gates were all shut, and no attempt was made to attack them. The evening was quiet and was spent in fraternising by the British sailors and Chinese military police, each side being much interested in the other's uniforms and weapons.

January 7th.

There was a curious incident in the early morning. At 5 p.m. men on the *Wyvern* saw and heard a large crowd just outside the Concession. A thick mist rose and hid the crowd, and the noise presently died down. This crowd was neither seen nor heard by anybody in the Concession, although most people were awake and busied in packing their silver and other valuables.

No arrangements had been made for billeting the Chinese military police, and during the night all except two had drifted away. The British Consul telephoned for a fresh supply. The Concession gates were not opened as usual because of the absence of police. At 9 a.m. four more military police arrived; this gave two for each gate, and the gates were opened.

10 *a.m.*

Large crowds were walking about in the Concession, expressing their feelings by shouting and ostentatious expectoration. The Consul ordered the British to concentrate in two houses, one the Consulate and the other a house behind Jardine's hulk. This was done without incident, thus leaving most of the houses untenanted except by the servants.

Immediately, and perhaps naturally, looting of a tentative kind began. Chinese went into the deserted municipal building and stole some police uniforms and smashed some furniture. Soldiers of the 6th and 7th Armies were going to the back doors of the houses, being let in by terrified servants, and rummaging about for any valuables that had been left. It was safe but unpleasant to walk about. The military police, who belong to the 2nd Independent Division, did their best to stop the looting, but could not do much with men who did not belong to their division or even to the same army. At noon they closed the gates, letting people out but not letting them in. Rain came, everybody hurried home, and the Concession gradually cleared. At 3.15 a Chinese company commander,

with 100 men, arrived at the Consulate. He went round the Concession with two Englishmen, and on meeting a soldier with any loot, took it from him and solemnly handed it to the Englishmen, who, as the loot was usually a scrap of curtain or other useless junk, dumped it in the gutter. This Chinese officer tore the regimental badges from some of the pilfering soldiers, and made one at least kneel down while he took a running kick at him.

4 *p.m.*

The Consulate was evacuated. The British sailors and the several civilians in the Consulate helped to remove all valuables, and this evacuation must have looked very like a departure of more efficient looters than the Chinese. Sailors were loaded up with silver mugs, etc. Everyone carried something, so that when the Consul had the flag hauled down from the flagstaff there was grave difficulty in presenting arms, solved by dumping the stuff in the garden and picking it up again.

General Ho gave the Consul a certificate that he (General Ho) would thenceforth be responsible for everything. Such pilfering as happened later was done by stealth. It is curious to observe that at 6 p.m. of that day a party of fifteen, two men and the rest women and children, who had come down to Duff's Farm from Kuling, came through the Chinese streets into the Concession and down to the ships without molestation.

That, briefly, is the story of what happened at Kiukiang, given to me on H.M.S. *Woodlark* after dinner by eye-witnesses. Since January 7th the men of the British colony had been living on the *Kiangwo*. On

February 24th they were still living there. There seemed to be some indignation among them because I happened to describe the looting as less efficient than it might have been. There was also considerable disapproval of official British policy. A message was sent to me in the *Woodlark* to say that I was expected in the *Wild Swan*. There in the wardroom a hot but good-tempered reception had been prepared. I was put in a chair and subjected to a concentrated bombardment from all sides. I did my best in the unaccustomed rôle of a defender of Sir Austen Chamberlain, but at last asked whether they had similarly bombarded his official representative, Mr. O'Malley, who had been there the previous night. They said regretfully that he had insisted on going to bed. That, I suppose, was how it was that they had so much ammunition to waste on me.

NOTE.—After this chapter was already in page, when it was too late to make more than verbal corrections in it, I saw a letter dated June 7th, in which my chief informant of February 24th complained that it was insufficiently lurid. It would, of course, have strengthened such argument as there is in this book in favour of the present British policy of altering Anglo-Chinese relations if I had stressed the extent to which the relations that at present obtain can be used in stirring the passions of a Chinese mob. I was, however, anxious not to overstate things and wished to emulate the moderation and freedom from excitement with which my informant related events which must have been exciting and nerve-racking enough to their participants. Some of the corrections in his June letter do not tally with the notes which I took almost sentence by sentence during our February conversation, and I prefer to trust these notes rather than his

much later recollections. Among the points on which he insists are that for some days crowds had been harangued by agitators about the barbed wire, that I have not sufficiently insisted on the threatening character of the crowds, and that the saluting police had formerly been employed by the municipality and were hoping to get their salaries from the English if they failed to get them from the Chinese. In general he thinks that this account suggests that there was no danger and that the English ran away. I should be very sorry if such an impression were produced. An inflammable mob is always dangerous and there was no running away. The evacuation was perfectly justified, because there was a risk that the situation might develop to a point that would make it necessary to fire on the crowd, an act the avoidance of which was dictated by British policy.

THE EXECUTIONER

February 26, 1927.

ABOUT nine in the morning we came to Nanking, threading our way through the anchored warships—Japanese, American, and British—and tied up to the pontoon. The shipping company's agent came aboard and told us gravely a wild story that Hangchow had not been captured by the Southerners, but that Sun Chuan-fang's troops had run away from a division of their own men and, on the mistake being discovered, had shamefacedly filtered back into the town. This story was quite untrue, but it illustrates the welter of political rumour in which everybody on the Yangtze seems to live.

Nanking is a place of great historical interest. Here, on board H.M.S. *Cornwallis*, in 1842, was signed the treaty which laid the foundation for that edifice of foreign privileges which is now challenged more or less politely by "the friendly North," more or less rudely by the Nationalists. Here in 1911 goose ponds were choked with the bodies of slaughtered Manchu women. Here on New Year's Day, 1912, Sun Yat-sen took up the Presidency of the Chinese Republic. Here on February 14th of the same year he resigned in favour of Yuan Shi-kai, and one day later went out with ceremony to the Tomb of Ming Tai Tsu to inform the ghost of the founder of the last Chinese dynasty that by evicting the Manchus he had put the Chinese once more in

possession of their own country. Here, in normal times, Yangtze tourists, like myself, visit this same tomb and others, and buy souvenirs, fans, and porcelain jars, by the south gate of the old walled city. To-day no tourists went to the tomb of the Ming Emperor ; the fans and porcelains were exposed in vain. History was not a static thing, but was moving with some speed and discomfort in the present.

Chang Tsung-chang, the ex-bandit tupan of Shantung, after waiting until his compulsory ally Sun Chuan-fang had been reduced to impotence, was now hurrying down to Shanghai to pluck the fruits of his wisdom before they could be gathered by the Nationalists, who had so obligingly cleared the way for him. He had not forgotten that Sun Chuan-fang had driven him from Shanghai eighteen months before. It was now his turn, not to drive out Sun Chuan-fang but to rescue him, just so late as to be able with polite regret to see him resign in favour of his rescuer. The commandeered yellow ships of the China merchants were busy moving the Shantung troops across the river from Pukow to Nanking, whence they would be sent by rail to Shanghai.

We crossed the river to Pukow to pick up cargo at Butterfield and Swire's pontoon. Pukow consists of a big railway station, the terminus of the line from Tientsin, a number of go-downs (warehouses) belonging to the shipping firms, and a big straggling town or village store of single-story huts, looking from a distance more like an encampment than a permanent settlement. The foreshore, with the covered platforms on the bank, was crowded with troops in grey clothes in a state of

indescribable squalor. I went ashore and struggled along through moving crowds of soldiers to the Pukow station and back again. I was looking for a human being. The nearest approach to one that I saw was a pony, who seemed to have some intelligence and kindliness, and next to him a rather charming little buffalo. These two were of a decidedly higher order than any of the two-legged animals I saw. On a track that was being laid down to the water's edge was an armoured train, manned by "White" Russians completely brutalised by a dozen years of war and civil war. These men are said to be far worse than the worst of the Chinese soldiers and to behave as if they were in a hostile country peopled exclusively by their personal enemies. So badly did they behave on the way here, I was told by an Englishman, that the Chinese commander, himself a notorious brute, had one of them executed in the elaborate manner of the thousand slices by way of example to the rest. Another thirty had been seen being led off on a single rope, the rope being passed through a hole made in the lower jaw of each man. My informant did not know what had become of them. The armoured train looked an efficient instrument of destruction.

The whole place was a jostling mass of soldiers, coolies carrying munitions, beggars, ponies, and buffalo carts no doubt commandeered from wretched peasants. I saw only one man who was uncrowded. He stood on the bank just above the foreshore looking across the river. He was not tall, but athletically built, and his face was without expression of any kind. It might

have been a mask of yellow mud. He stood with his mouth half open, his eyes half closed. All around him there was a space of half a dozen yards. He was the only man whom no one jostled. Slung on his back was a sword of unusual pattern, with a long stout handle to which were tied some stained rags. The blade of the sword was broad and short and encased in a scabbard of brown leather like the guard of an old-fashioned razor. The shape of it was the shape of a meat-chopper. I asked whether the Chinese still fought with two-handed swords. "That man does not fight," I was told. I asked why he carried such a heavy and extraordinary sword. "That man," I was told, "is the executioner." I understood then how it was that he alone was not jostled by the crowd. Those beasts shunned him as cattle shun a butcher. This was the skilled labourer who can cut off a man's head with a single merciful blow or destroy him slowly with a thousand small amputations made so cunningly that the victim does not die until the last slice. As I passed him he turned towards me. His mouth remained half open, his eyes half shut. He stared at me for a moment. I suppose I passed nearer to him than people usually do.

Dodging the heels of the little bedraggled Chinese ponies, slipping in the filthy mud, holding my breath at the worst smells, I went slowly back to the ship. Loading had not begun. On the pontoon a cobbler was squatting mending a shoe for a customer, who stood with his unshod foot on a little piece of leather. Two hawkers in rags were sharing between them some sticky sweetmeat that they had been unable to sell. A Chinese official

with a skull-cap, dressed partly in plain black silk, partly in olive brocade, enlivened with large flowers of the same colour, tottered along in a state of coma (opium, I was told) to superintend the loading. He came on to the pontoon supported by a respectful servant. Two policemen swinging long canes stood laughing and joking. Four small boys without excitement pummelled a fifth. There was no sign of cargo. At last it was explained that while the gang of coolies whose monopoly it was to carry cargo from the pontoon to the ship were willing to work, the gang whose monopoly it was to carry the cargo from the go-down to the pontoon were demanding a 400 per cent. increase in wages. We signalled for the shipping company to send someone in authority. He came, but said that nothing could be done. We had wasted five hours. We cast off from the pontoon and went on down river cargoless.

FOREIGN PRIVILEGE AND THE CHINESE CIVIL STRUGGLE

WHILE in Hankow I was given a list of members of the Nationalist Government, and was surprised to find that it included a number of persons who are at the moment in open opposition to it—C. C. Wu, for example. I asked for an explanation, and was told that in the Kuomintang there are no dismissals and no resignations, but that sometimes a politician has an intuition that it will be better for him to be in Shanghai or Hong-Kong. He trusts that intuition and departs without formal farewells, and will probably remain in these health resorts until some change in the political situation suggests to him the desirability of a return. If that should happen, as there has been no dismissal so there will be no reappointment. He will simply occupy his old place at the council-table and be congratulated on his convalescence. In this way humiliation is avoided by his friends, his enemies, and himself. This is an illustration of the way in which the foreign settlements and concessions, like the Legation quarter in Peking, have come to play a very important part in Chinese politics. A politician can at any moment assume a cap of invisibility by crossing a street. He is close at hand, surrounded by Chinese territory, can keep in close touch with events, and yet be inviolate. The unequal treaties have thus built up a system of political sanctuary from one end of China to the other.

War is affected in the same way as politics. Chinese war is not like draughts, a fight to a finish in which one side is eliminated. It is like chess, in which the game ends not with the capture of the king, but one move before his capture. The winner does not take his opponent's king from the board; the loser admits defeat without subjecting himself to this indignity. It is only in the rarest cases, when hostilities have been embittered by some personal feeling, that a general or politician loses his life except by gross miscalculation or by breaking the rules of the game. A Chinese general is expected to resign as soon as the position is such as to promise his defeat. He is expected to keep his wits about him and take sanctuary at the penultimate move. His enemy will allow him ample time to get away, together with a decent competence, on the implicit understanding that, should the position be reversed, a similar *esprit de corps* will produce the same sort of consideration for himself.

The method of getting away is to enter concession or settlement territory, and then, after making proper arrangements with banks and shipping companies, to take a luxurious tourist voyage to Japan. Of course, an obstinate general may by inaccurate judgment of the odds force his unwilling adversary to take him prisoner. His failure to obey the unwritten laws of the game is usually punished by decapitation or shooting. The detention and trial after some months of two generals by the Nationalists is considered a Western innovation and felt quite generally to be rather inhuman. The fate of the four generals whom they killed promptly,

after little more delay than was necessary to allow for their preliminary and polite entertainment to a first-class foreign-style dinner, seemed to arouse no such feeling. In the case of the generals tried at Wuchang it was made clear that the chief count against them was that they had not " played the game " but had insisted on dragging out an unnecessary siege, protracting the sufferings of the population, and causing the deaths of valued soldiers on both sides long after they should have realised that it was time for them courteously to abscond.

The foreign banks, like the concessions, contribute largely to the amenity of Chinese civil war and political strife. Once loot is turned into money and deposited with them by the looter it is sacred and beyond public recovery. Cases have been known in which generals, far from expecting interest on their deposits, have been eager to pay the banks a small percentage for the privilege of being allowed thus to cache their gain. At a town up the Yangtze a Chinese military commander visited the American-Oriental Bank and said that he wished to deposit with them, instead of in his own headquarters, what he politely called his records, and left thirty large trunks with the bank. He was presently defeated, and the bank manager was a little disturbed as to what he should do if the incoming conqueror were to demand that these records be handed over. But the incoming war-lord felt equally insecure, and was more concerned to get his own records safely into the bank than to obtain those of his enemy. Another huge batch of trunks was brought in, and the bank

manager, much relieved, had both sets of trunks piled one beside the other.

Besides the foreign banks there are foreign steamship companies which make it easy and comparatively safe to go from one side of the front to the other. Chinese business men go up the Yangtze into Nationalist territory and down river into Northern territory with only the slightest risk. The searching of British steamers is an innovation and is not done with any thoroughness, and the free-and-easy passage from one camp to the other is being made difficult less by the Chinese than by British unwillingness to carry Chinese passengers. A tradition of foreign control and inviolability still clings about the Chinese Post Office, through which men on both sides correspond with only the slightest regard for the front that separates them.

While in Hankow I received one of the many devastating attacks on militarists and enthusiastic hymns in praise of Nationalism (of which two or three were pushed under my door every day) through the post in an envelope with the Shanghai post-mark. It was addressed to me " care of His Excellency Mr. Eugene Chen," a Foreign Minister by no means officially recognised by the general in command of Shanghai district. Some sort of censorship has been set up both at Hankow and at Shanghai, but it is still possible for Northerners in Hankow and Nationalists in Shanghai to write and send their letters by the official channels from one side of the front to the other. Again, Nationalists in Shanghai get daily news by foreign steamer from their friends at Ningpo. But for the inaccuracy of the

Chinese mind, which prevents Chinese from placing too much confidence in any information, it would be possible by daily publication of positions and number of troops on both sides to avoid bloodshed of any kind whatever and make Chinese civil war as safe for soldiers as it is for generals, and to ensure that the whole of the sufferings due to it, instead of only 99 per cent., shall be borne by the civilian population.

It is obvious that the abolition of extra-territoriality in China will make war and political strife much more dangerous for generals and politicians. Its first result will be that a great many heads will sit very loosely on their owners' shoulders. Generals incapable of modest self-effacement will be forced to be more hurried in their departures for Japan. Ejected politicians will be unable to combine accessibility for their friends with inaccessibility for their enemies while they keep up unhindered propaganda, but will have to go into hiding. China will become a most uncomfortable place for those Chinese who have used the foreigner in order to be both in China and out of it. I put this point to Mr. C. T. Wang, ex-Foreign Minister, who was at the moment living safely in the French Concession, and had been urging the abolition of extra-territoriality. I asked him how it was that while opposed to it he took advantage of it. He replied with great common sense that he desired the abolition of an injustice to China, but that while that injustice persisted he would be a fool if he did not make the best possible use of it.

No Chinese general or politician is done until he is dead, and it seems to me strange that, among the many arguments against extra-territoriality brought forward by the Chinese, they do not include this, with which we could but sympathise—namely, that its abolition would be a step towards the shortening of the civil war and so an advantage to all who wish to do business with China. Foreign privilege in China tends to perpetuate strife by lessening the risks that must be undertaken by its leaders. Abolition of foreign privilege would mean grave discomfort for foreigners living in China and for defeated Chinese leaders. It would, however, increase the dangers of civil war and so shorten its duration. I think there can be little doubt that if Russia had been dotted with extra-territorial enclosures in which defeated parties in the civil war might lick their wounds before renewing the fighting the Russian civil war would still be blazing. It blazed just as long as foreigners made it possible, and then came rapidly to an end. Something of the sort may still occur in China. Poor ways of communication will allow banditry to continue for longer in China than in Russia, where ways of communication are slightly less poor, but the major struggle would be ended sooner if our position in the country did not facilitate the resurrection of the defeated. But for our privileges, civil war in China would become more ruthless. It would have more finality and it would become in itself a less inviting and more risky occupation. Is it not conceivable that for this reason alone the abolition of foreign privilege would in the long run increase the volume of our trade? A customer

who spends the major part of his income in financing a pack of cynical generals with vested interests in the permanence of a state of war has less money to spare than he might have for keeping, for example, Lancashire factories employed.

SOME CHINESE GENERALS

They all say they are good, but who can tell the sex of a crow ?—*Chinese Proverb.*

THE Chinese generals who come to the top are seldom turned out by machinery. They climb by skill, rapacity, and energy of character. They have this in common with a figure at one time prominent on the advertisement hoardings, that "Force is the food that raises them." It consequently happens that, however much we may deplore their individual misdeeds or their dominance of the Chinese scene, it is impossible not to relish in them something of that careless genius for the picturesque which, at the safe distance of a century or two, we admire in our own buccaneers.

Chiang Kai-shek has great qualities of his own, but his political intelligence alone removes him far from that galaxy of professional war-lords from whom I propose to take three or four illuminating examples. Hitherto, at least, he has been a "Parliament man," and so, gaining in historical importance, has lost something of that violence in primary colours which distinguishes the great individualists of the North. Of these, four are men who have in turn, with easy, competent swagger, seized the middle of the stage.

Chang Tso-lin is the best known. A small, delicate-handed, gentle-faced, and ruthless bandit chief, he won his way to official recognition and a marshalship by being too dangerous a brigand to be otherwise dealt

with than by giving him and his men uniforms and accepting them as a body of the regular army. I believe it was he who, when asked by some innocent person where he had received his education, replied, without a moment's pause, " In the School of Forestry." For a long time the Japanese and the Russians, controlling the railway through his domains, have kept up a narrow strip of law and order which has won him a scarcely deserved reputation among persons who do not know that the cars have to be armoured to protect them from those embryo marshals who, still in the bandit stage, are passing through that same " School of Forestry " of which Chang Tso-lin has shown himself so remarkable a pupil, and that even to-day it is unsafe, without escort, to go more than a mile or two outside his towns. Now, in his old age, he has a passionate wish to be, if only for a day, President of China, less for any immediate satisfaction than for the glorifying of his posterity.

Leaving that venerable figure to drive through the streets of Peking in an armour-plated box on wheels, designed to protect him from too emphatic appreciation of his past deeds and present aims, over brown sand spread over the road before him in imitation of the ceremonial used when Chinese Emperors drove abroad, let us turn to a younger war-lord of his party, General Chang Tsung-chang.

Chang Tsung-chang was born in 1880 in the Shantung province, and slipped easily in and out of civilian clothes, being alternately a private soldier and a brigand. He prospered best in the latter capacity, and was already a well-known bandit leader in Manchuria at the time of

the Russo-Japanese War, when the Russians gave him the rank of a captain and found him useful as a leader of guerrilla troops. Chang Tso-lin was being employed in the same way by the Japanese. He learnt Russian, and for this reason Chang Tso-lin has now put him in command of the White Russian mercenaries, several thousands of whom he took south with him when he made an attempt to save Shanghai for the North, purposely delaying his assistance in the hope of himself replacing the other Northern general, Sun Chuan-fang, who had been enjoying its Customs surtaxes and opium revenues. Chang is several inches over six feet high, a giant among the Chinese. He has several " wives," to whom he is ceremoniously faithful, besides a collection of rather over a score of minor concubines, among whom are several Russians. When formerly in Shanghai he brought one of his latest acquisitions into the Settlement to a large bachelor party of foreigners, whom he made dance with her in turn while he looked on with generous delight. Recently, in Peking, he attended, with his ladies, an entertainment at which a Russian gipsy dancer performed. Chang leapt to his feet and, hurrying up to one of his minor wives, pulled some rings from her fingers, snatched a bracelet from the wrist of another, tore the earrings from a third, and then, in the most courtly manner, presented the handful of jewels to the astonished actress. It was he who, travelling with a timid little foreign correspondent, called for cigars, and, when the boy brought a box of half-Coronas, threw them out of the window with a roar, " I asked for cigars." The boy, feeling his neck to make sure his

head was still on his shoulders, brought back a box of the biggest cigars he could find. Chang politely offered one to his companion, who dared to say he did not smoke. Chang took a cigar from the box, bit off the end with his great teeth, lit it, and pushed it straight into the mouth of the man, with the laconic remark "You do." Some time afterwards this same correspondent was telling another of this adventure when the other inadvertently offered him a cigarette, and then hurriedly apologised, "I forgot you did not smoke." "Now I do," was the rather pathetic reply.

The next exhibit is the so-called Christian General, Feng Yu-hsiang. There is, by the way, a "Buddhist General" in the South, whose notion it is to weld his army with the Buddhist faith and make of it a force comparable to the soldiers of Feng Yu-hsiang, who march to the tune of "Onward, Christian soldiers." I am told, however, that he is a less interesting character than Feng. It may be only that he is less well known. Feng was born in 1880, and was educated in one of the military schools with the object of becoming an officer. He began his career by leaving school at the age of eighteen and enlisting as an ordinary private. He has fought on all sides and betrayed several. He was for some time a devout Christian, and to mark his faith married a second wife who was the secretary of a branch of the Young Women's Christian Association. His troops spend much of their time in religious exercises and the rest in hard work. They do not loot, but when at peace make roads. It was this activity of theirs that gave him for a time the command of the capital. He

was ordered by Wu Pei-fu, who was then fighting Chang Tso-lin, to advance northwards. His troops made so excellent a road for their advance that when Feng decided to strike out for himself he was able to return south to Peking with his army so rapidly that he seized the city without firing a shot. He protested against the habit, which was prevalent among Peking officials, of cutting down old trees that were public property and selling them to fill their private purses by plastering the walls with huge signs, "Save the trees and save the country." In Peking I saw trees being cut down along a wall on which were a number of large plaster patches which were, I was told, the remains of his placards and which had been obliterated to lessen the scandal of the proceedings. During his Christian period, or rather his extreme Christian period, for he is still a Christian, he earned the reputation of an ascetic by being extremely frugal in his public meals. A friend of his explained to me that he was able to do this and yet to work very hard by beginning the day with a gigantic private breakfast of beefsteaks. He has a habit of having his subordinate generals bambooed for small infractions of discipline. His, though poorly equipped, is said to be a model army. He recently visited Moscow and returned a Communist, though on religious grounds rather contemptuous of the Russians, who, he said, practised Christianity but apparently knew nothing about Christ. Still more recently he added to the religious training of his men a course in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles," and expressed his complete political agreement with the Kuomintang. He is said to be moving North from the Shensi province

with the object of once more striking at Peking and threatening Chang Tso-lin's retreat to Manchuria. The latest news is that the Nationalists in Hankow, disappointed in Chiang Kai-shek, have appointed this Christian, Communist, Kuomintang, beefsteak-eating, ascetic disciplinarian the Nationalist Commander-in-Chief.

My fourth general is Marshal Wu Pei-fu. Marshal Wu is by far the most sympathetic of the Northern war-lords, perhaps because he is in at least temporary eclipse. He is a Chinese who received the old Confucian education. He is popular among foreign employers of Chinese labour because he has a short way with trade-unionists. At the same time he has himself "downed tools" for economic reasons, and once withdrew his troops from one campaign because they were not getting their pay while other troops on the same side were getting theirs. Defeated in the North by the Christian General's treachery, he made his way to Hankow, where he established himself for a considerable time. Driven from there by the Nationalists, he had his headquarters in Honan in the town of Chengchow, where, while his generals stupefied themselves with opium and played Mah Jong, he wrote poems. Chang Tso-lin's son drove him thence, when he rode off to Loyang with little beside his favourite pony and a roll of manuscript verse. A soldier was killed close beside him in a battle, and he wrote in defeat :—

The cold wind from the west stirs my old battle cloak.
To look upon the bloodstain on the cloak brings sorrow to my heart.
My only possessions now are my loyal heart and brave soul.
These will be with me for ever, despite the ice and snow of the present situation.

The Nationalists also can make verses, and the publication of some of Wu's verses brought spirited rejoinders from Canton. One of these was published in the *Canton Gazette* :—

The ancient-minded men of the North
Are as trees whose branches are withered.
In Kwantung and on the old Yangtze
The Morning Sun is shining.
Yellow hair and a child's teeth—such is the ancient ideology of our enemies, who yet are our brothers.
They have known many changes of furs and grass cloth,
But the newer wisdom of to-day is not theirs.
Now they are facing their end.
The future belongs to the clean, fresh blood of youth.
A halo round the moon for wind and a moistened pavement before rain—
That, for the truly wise, is a portent of what is to come.
Between us and the ancient-minded men
There is ice and ardent charcoal. . . .

Wu Pei-fu, poet and Confucian scholar, is certainly an ancient-minded man, but equally certainly he is the best of such men. Alone almost among Chinese generals and politicians he has consistently refused in defeat to take advantage of the foreign Settlements and Concessions, which are generally used as sanctuaries. He evades his enemies, but never by leaving Chinese soil. The presence among the war-lords of such characters as Wu Pei-fu, reactionary, poet, sportsman, and profiteer of the opium trade, and Feng Yu-hsiang, with his Cromwellian mixture of Christianity and military discipline, makes it a little unjust to end this chapter on militarists with another Chinese proverb, fitly applied to most of them : " All bad flesh smells alike."

CHINESE GRIEVANCES

We are officially committed to a policy of meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese. If you ask the Chinese what are their legitimate aspirations, they refer immediately to "the unequal treaties," which Northerners and Southerners are all at one in wishing to see annulled.

The first point that they seek to make is that the treaties were indeed "unequal," being imposed by one side on the other and not the result of mutual, friendly agreement. Mr. Wong Ching-wei, spokesman of the Kuomintang, is the spokesman of all educated China when he says: "The Nanking Treaty was the result of the Opium War. The Tientsin and Peking Treaties were extorted by the united forces of the English and the French. The Makwan Treaty was the result of the Sino-Japanese War. The Boxer Treaty was extorted by the united forces of eight Powers. All these were violent robberies, without the consent of the Chinese people." Is it surprising that, holding this view of the treaties and met by those who are unwilling to see them abrogated by references to the sanctity of International Law, he should exclaim, "What is International Law? It is an instrument for maintaining the privileges which the strong nations have obtained from the weak." It is not surprising that he should make that exclamation and not surprising that Chinese generally should echo it.

But when, admitting that the treaties were in fact

arrangements by which, on various occasions, China bought peace, you say to the Chinese, "Yes, but the point is, in what way to-day does China suffer from these same treaties?" you will be lucky if you can get a coherent answer. The Chinese are so accustomed to denouncement of the treaties on the historical grounds of their inequality that, except in a very few cases, they have not bothered to go further and are utterly at a loss when asked to prove actual damage. Yet their case, when, after listening to many of them, you piece it together, is a pretty good one. I shall try to state it as fairly as I can.

Thanks to the treaties, they have lost control of their own Customs. They are not able themselves to decide what tax they may levy on incoming and outgoing goods. Now it so happens that the Chinese are among the continental peoples lamentably persuaded of the advantages of protection. We contributed to their adoption of this erroneous view by killing their tea-trade with us by putting a duty on Chinese tea of something like 200 per cent. They reason, If the English taxed our tea in order to favour Indian tea, why cannot we tax English textiles in order to favour our own mills? The answer to that is that through the treaties the Chinese have lost the power of putting more than a nominal tariff on anything. I fear there is no doubt that when the Chinese regain tariff autonomy they will use it to clap on duties in a protectionist frenzy and high fever exaggerated by previous suppression, which will have to be allowed to reduce itself, as it will reduce itself, to the absurd. Experience and not war

will cure them of their delusion. We do not go to war with countries which put on ridiculous import duties, or we should be fighting Esthonia, Russia, America and, alas ! ourselves. The Chinese, wrong-headed in many things, are surely right in thinking that they are an oppressed nation, so long as other people are able to prevent them from trying any foolish experiments in protection that may please them.

Then, too, they share the view of many British Chancellors of the Exchequer that they have only to clap on import duties to raise their revenue. Consequently, they say, by preventing us from having a free hand with our own Customs duties, you prevent us from raising our revenue, thereby compelling us to borrow from yourselves at rates which you, among yourselves, decide. They thus attribute to the compulsory smallness of their import duties not only the inability of Chinese manufacturers to compete with foreigners, but the prevailing emptiness of the Chinese Treasury, and to that in turn they attribute the disgusting venality of their officials, the systematic robbery of what little public money there is, the neglect of the State railways, the cutting down of trees, the selling of ancient monuments (walls, temples, etc.) as building material, and, indeed, without looking further, all the more regrettable symptoms of the decay of Chinese public life.

A great part of the Chinese revenue is earmarked for the payment of interest on loans, and the Chinese complain that, thanks to this, the financial capital of China has been shifted from the political capital to Shanghai, and there, actually, into the International Settlement.

They complain that this geographical displacement of the financial centre of the country is not accidental, but corresponds accurately to the position of the ruling interests in China, which are foreign and not Chinese. They complain that the clearing-house for the Customs revenue is in Shanghai, and that the money is banked with foreign banks, which are thus given a massive financial backing, for lack of which the Chinese banks suffer. The result of this is, in their opinion, that Chinese revenue is used to strengthen foreign business at the expense of Chinese, so that every port opened to trade in China is in effect an instrument that works against Chinese interests. As Mr. Wong says, in a book (*China and the Nations*) which all who seek to understand the Chinese point of view should read, "Apart from the international control of tariffs, we should not mind opening as many ports as possible. But, so long as this continues, every additional port opened in China is an additional curse to her." If, in answer to this, you say to the Chinese that after all China has had the benefit of the loans, they make three replies. Some of the loans, they say, were contracted with the knowledge of the Powers against the will of the Chinese Parliament. Most of the loans, they say, would have been unnecessary, if they had had a free hand in raising import duties. With this statement it is hard to agree, but with the third reply, that many of the loans were forced upon China by her need to meet foreign aggression and to indemnify or buy off the aggressors, no student of Chinese history can quarrel.

Because foreigners live in the Concessions, the Chinese demand for their rendition has come to seem abroad the most important point in the Chinese Nationalist programme. This is not so. All Chinese demand the rendition of the Concessions, but the existence of these comparatively luxurious ghettoes is not one of their chief grievances, but rather a secondary one. They do, indeed, say, " Force of arms obtained you the Concessions, and now you use the Concessions as an excuse again to bring foreign troops into our country "; but they are clear enough in thinking that the Concessions are actually a mitigation of the state of affairs produced by the existence of extra-territoriality or Consular jurisdiction. The grievance of the Concessions is secondary to this more fundamental complaint. The pride of the Chinese is hurt by the existence of these independent plutocratic republics of foreigners scattered about his country, and the foreigners in the Concessions do nothing to soften and much to exasperate that pain; but so long as foreigners in China are not subject to the laws of the country, the more they tend to herd together in easily defined areas, the less does their abnormal status interfere with or become obvious in the national life. There is, for example, more bitterness over the encroachment of foreign municipal authority along foreign municipal roads made by foreigners outside the Shanghai Settlement than there is over the actual existence of areas for a long time under foreign control. The existence of Concessions and similar areas is almost a natural corollary of Consular jurisdiction, but their expansion, on excuses no matter how ingenious, is an

unbearable suggestion that the era of Consular jurisdiction is not coming presently to an end.

Consular jurisdiction has expanded from quite modest beginnings. To-day it means that a foreigner in China, unless he be German, Austrian, or Russian, is subject not to Chinese but to foreign law, administered not by Chinese but by foreigners. Foreign nationality is, accordingly, a valuable possession, and, in the case of certain countries, the Chinese claim that it is the staple of their trade with China. The inviolability of houses that have a claim to fly a foreign flag makes them, even outside the Concessions, sanctuaries for fugitives from Chinese justice or injustice. Chinese law being what it is, and the state of China being one in which extortion of the grossest kind can be freely practised, the effect of Consular jurisdiction is not only to make foreigners a privileged class, but, by extending their privileges in varying degree to those Chinese who are associated with them in business (or even in religious faith), to cause a natural flow of Chinese capital, both in the form of labour and in that of money, into foreign instead of into Chinese concerns. It is therefore looked upon by the Chinese Nationalists not only as in itself a derogation of Chinese sovereignty, but also as an instrument which tends inevitably to strengthen the domination of foreign interests in China. They say that this instrument must be destroyed unless they are to resign themselves to the eventual political as well as economic subjection of China to people who are not Chinese.

This, I think, is the cause of the increasing urgency of Chinese discontent, so far as that discontent concerns

the foreigner, namely, their realisation that their wrongs or the disadvantages that have been forced upon them are not static but cumulative in effect. In considering their complaints, I doubt if we allow sufficient weight to their belated realisation of the direction of Chinese history, at any rate up to the beginning of the European War. They complain of what is, but they complain less of that than of what may be. Contact with the West, adoption, regrettable perhaps, of Western standards and interests, has brought the spokesmen of present-day China to see how much of her independence China has lost. The Treaties, Control of the Customs, Concessions, Settlements, and Consular Jurisdiction are for them to-day signs of their own intolerable downfall and reasons for the difficulty of their recovery.

CHINESE AND FOREIGNERS

THE visitor to China who inquires from the foreigners he meets as to the Chinese attitude towards the foreign population of the country is given a great deal of seemingly contradictory information. The same people who tell him that the Chinese are anxious in a sort of blind hatred to turn all foreigners into the sea, and that their grievances are merely the unreal excuses for this kind of hatred, also tell him that "The Chinese, the real Chinese, are delightful. But, of course, not these people with a smattering of Western knowledge." Of these statements, the first, I am persuaded, is untrue, while the second is unfortunately irrelevant. It means simply that those Chinese are delightful who do not claim, in their own country, equality with the foreigner. Inquiry pursued further invariably elicits examples, in the boatswain of a private houseboat, in the No. 1 boy, a sort of male housekeeper ("I do not know what I shall do without him in England"), or in the peasants who tolerate trespass by foreigners out shooting. There is nothing to cavil at in this appreciation of the Chinese as domestic servants or as the kindly, inquisitive, but respectful creatures who give human interest to Chinese landscape. But it is really no more than an admission (strange in some mouths) that the Chinese is a human being and that he responds to friendly advances until his natural friendliness is dissipated by a political idea. But the plain humanity of a nation is not proof against

leadership, least of all in a country like China, where most of the population suffers, beside extreme poverty, much discomfort of other kinds and worse government than would long ago have moved most peoples to a frenzy of revolt. Where a nation has legitimate grievances *against itself*, but there is even the appearance of foreign domination, discontent is always likely to take the view that if only the foreigner were out of the way it would be easy to get through with the necessary spring-cleaning at home. The friendliest masses will accept such a theory. Egypt is an obvious example. There, too, one heard of the natural friendliness of the real Egyptian, the *fellahin*. That did not prevent them from supporting Zaghlul, himself a *fellah*, in violent protest against British ascendancy.

Friendliness in human beings politically unstirred may almost be taken for granted. It is not a factor in such a problem as that which faces us in China. When we ask about the attitude of the Chinese towards foreigners, it is not because we need telling that Chinese coolies and servants have not normally any particular grudge against the foreigner, who, when he employs them, treats them probably much better than they would be treated by their fellow-countrymen. What we do want to know is the relation between the foreigners in China and those of the Chinese who form the opinion of the nation when it comes to the point of action. We are concerned with the attitude towards foreigners of the younger generation of educated or half-educated Chinese. Even the war-lords of the North deal with us through such men, and the leaders of the Kuomintang

are precisely those Chinese "with a smattering of Western knowledge" whose "reality" our foreign informers so impatiently question.

Gradually, talking day after day with foreigners and with the Chinese who have in actual fact shown that they can induce the masses of their countrymen to follow them, the Chinese with whom we now have to deal as once we dealt with the mandarins, I came to the conclusion that there had been a very remarkable exchange of attitudes between the foreigners and the Chinese in China.

You cannot be long—you cannot be a week—in the country without hearing from foreigners (when they have told you about the hatred and the friendliness) that the secret attitude of the Chinese towards the foreigner is one of contempt, tempered by fear. That statement was true, once upon a time, but to-day it illustrates only how carelessly the resident foreigner observes the changes at his door and how obstinately retrospective is his mind. It looks back to the old days when the men who ruled in China had interests very different from those of the foreigners with whom they had unwillingly to deal. It looks back to the days when the foreigner did indeed present himself to the mind of the peacock-feathered mandarin as a turbulent, greedy-minded hooligan who was strong enough to force mandarins to agree with him in such matters as concerned trading, in which it was below the dignity of a mandarin to take any serious interest. In those days the mandarin's contempt for the foreigners was indeed tempered by fear, because the foreigners, while

intellectually of a low order, had a dreadful power of combining in action. Intellectually contemptible, their unity made them invincible, and the mandarin had the same sort of respect for them that Bishop Hatto must have had for the mice.

But those days have passed. The old fear of the united foreigner was weakened by the European War and still further weakened by those sections of the foreign business community in China which made use of the war as a pretext to persuade the Chinese to turn their trade rivals (Germans) out of the country. The Chinese have been taught that foreigners will welcome against one of their number who happens to be unpopular deeds which they would resist by force of arms if committed against themselves. The Russians are blamed for teaching the Chinese that foreigners are not indivisible. We must share that responsibility. Extra-territoriality was taken with British approval from Germans and Austrians after the war. Is it surprising that the Chinese have now high hopes of taking it from us? More recently, the Diplomatic Corps in Peking allowed Chang Tso-lin's troops to enter the hitherto sacred Legation Quarter, to raid foreign buildings there, and, under protest too late to be effective, to seize diplomatic documents. We shall have only ourselves to thank if, on a later occasion, the premises violated, the papers seized, are those of the British or the French. The fear of the united foreigner has gone. But the contempt has gone also. The people who speak for China to-day (with perhaps a little, but certainly not much, more right to speak for it than was enjoyed by

the mandarins) are interested in the same sort of things as ourselves. Many of them have been abroad and have returned to China with envy of the foreigner, an emotion much more active and dangerous than contempt. The mandarins' attitude of superiority has been exchanged for that of traders who see in the advantages obtained by the foreigner disadvantages to themselves in their efforts to establish similar business. The old, comfortable conception of the Chinese as a mandarin conceding under compulsion things he did not value to persons whom he despised for wanting them is, like most of the ideas current in the foreign business community in China, at least a quarter of a century out of date.

But something very like the contempt and fear once felt by the Chinese when he thought of the foreigner is now felt (and shown) by the foreigner when he thinks of the Chinese. The contempt is one of the causes of the present bitterness in a conflict which is, at bottom, economic, and the fear must be taken into consideration by those who wish to understand why foreigners resident in China are inclined to urge on their home governments a panic policy of running amuck. Like the mandarins', the foreigners' fear is not of individuals but of their power of united action. The foreigner is afraid, not of any Chinese, but of the newly demonstrated Chinese power of uniting in strikes, boycotts, trade unions, mobs, and, to a certain extent, even in a political party. There is something terrible in the Chinese when they all think the same thing, when, for example, the shooting of a few of them by foreign policemen calls forth similar protests from one end of that continent of a country to the other. Fear

of this kind is apt to destroy a man's sense of realities and to lead him, by putting up sandbags and barricades and making a show of inadequate but provocative force, to exasperate and bring into full play the very quality in the Chinese that he most fears. For the sight of foreigners in England putting up barbed wire and showing themselves behind sandbags with rifles and machine guns would in our present state of development be an almost irresistible invitation to attack them. The Chinese may be more prudent; they may count the odds more carefully than the Westerner; but they are neither so backward nor so advanced as not to feel in a similar case the same impulses that we should feel ourselves. And if we wish to unite China or any other country against us, the best of all ways is to go to war with it. Every blow struck by foreigners in China is a blow in the welding of the nation. But that fear of Chinese in union has so far done nothing to lessen the foreigners' contempt for the Chinese. And just as one of the motives for the old wars between the Western Powers and China was foreign resentment of the contemptuous attitude of the Chinese, so now one of the forces uniting the Chinese is their resentment of the contemptuous attitude of the foreigners. There is no need to analyse the ways in which that contempt is shown: non-admission of Chinese even as guests to foreign clubs, extreme limitation of social intercourse (to this there are exceptions, of course), prohibition of Chinese enjoyment of parks and embankments for the upkeep of which they help to pay. It is impossible to talk to educated Chinese without becoming aware

that this is a matter of which they are most bitterly conscious. They are ashamed as they bring forward examples of it, and it is hard not to be ashamed in hearing some of these examples. A Chinese diplomatist, who made abroad many English friends, married a foreign wife, but made a home for her in Manchuria rather than, by taking her to Peking, let her see the attitude of foreigners towards his own countrymen in their own country. This is a complete reversal of the old position, when the Chinese refused to receive our envoys except in a humiliating manner. It is a regrettable state of affairs, like that other, and I am inclined to believe that it is due to the natural effect on foreigners of the privileges which they enjoy in China. Privilege is more effective than nationality in segregating a caste. It is always likely to lead to the public expression of what may privately be a justifiable sense of superiority. It is always clung to tenaciously, and fear of losing it explains some of the British opposition in Shanghai and similar places to a British policy that includes the curtailment of privilege and so an eventual lessening of that wall of contempt which contributes so much to the difficulty of our problem in China. As foreign privilege in China disappears, so, after a period during which remembrance of past humiliation may lead Chinese to be assertive overmuch, will disappear much of the distrust and resentment which now colours relations between the Chinese and their Western guests.

As for the alleged dislike of foreigners as such, I do not think it is any stronger with the Chinese than with ourselves. I have heard it said that they dislike

our smell and the sharp noses that project from our, to them, rather grotesque faces. It may be, but, when treated fairly as fellow-citizens, they hide these feelings very well, better, perhaps, than we disguise our distaste for their free spitting and unpleasantly noisy way of clearing their throats and noses. These things do not matter as between nations.

UP THE CHINA COAST

It was impossible to go by rail from Shanghai to Peking, and with railway traffic at an end there was very great difficulty in getting berths on any of the coasting passenger steamships. I learnt that I should have had to wait ten days or a fortnight for a passage on one of them, which would have meant giving up the visit to Peking altogether. I therefore rose eagerly to the chance of getting a berth on a little cargo steamer which had been taken, half painted, from dry dock in order to profit by the urgent demand for sea transport. She was a good and modest little ship, of about a thousand tons. As far as I could see, the only thing that justified her owner's insistence that her passenger accommodation was bad was that the cabin allotted to me was very small and that the paint in it was still wet. There were also rats and a noisy ash-shoot immediately behind my pillow. But I was lucky to get a cabin at all, and I have travelled farther and fared much worse in the Baltic without hearing any apologies from steamship companies, and I was well content. There were two other passengers, an engineer and a Vice-Consul, both young, one a very bad chess-player and the other about as bad as myself. The voyage up the coast was supposed to take three and a half days. We were carrying about a score of racing ponies, being sent up from Shanghai for the Peking meetings. These poor beasts travelled on deck, and it seemed to me extremely

cruel to make them travel in this way at all. Only the cheapness of ponies in China and a complete disregard for their welfare made such selfish treatment of them possible. We also carried a large mixed cargo, of which about 400 tons were for Chefoo and the rest for Tientsin. We sailed in the early morning, and at the mouth of the Whangpoo were met by a tug and a lighter, from which we took on board about a hundred and twenty cases of cartridges and hand-grenades for a foreign Power in Tientsin.

As soon as we had got outside the Yangtze we met a north-easterly blow, which soon became a pretty decided gale. The sea was described as " 6 " on the Beaufort scale. It would have been nothing to a liner, but for this little coaster it was quite bad enough. She pitched and rolled, and her pitching and rolling were not well harmonised, so that the result was a sort of corkscrew motion accompanied by violent jerks. The Consul gave in at once and took to his bed. The engineer and I did not like it, but retained our appetites and played chess after meals, carefully fielding the board when roll or pitch sent it sliding excitedly across the table. By wedging a little table against my bunk with portmanteaus and fixing a typewriter on the table with books, I was able to write a couple of articles, but I cracked my skull a good one in the companion-way and was once thrown backwards headlong, taking the skin off my elbows. The Chinese stable-boys were all sick, but some of the sailors did what they could for the ponies. The crew, in Chinese fashion, had traded their sleeping quarters to Chinese passengers, and dossed, cooks and

boys, in a compact mass on the pantry floor, others in odd corners about the alley-ways. Wind and sea were too much for the little steamer and her speed fell off, from eight knots to six, to five, to three, to one, until the mechanical log was hardly registering. In order not to let the deck cargo take charge or lose the unfortunate ponies overboard, the captain altered course and headed her straight into the sea. We were moving so slowly that we were practically hove to, though progressing slowly towards the north-east. We had plenty of sea-room, but no one had a very precise idea of our position, as the repairs and hammering in dry dock had caused a considerable and as yet unascertained deviation of the compass. The smell of wet white paint made the cabins almost untenable. After two or three hours' work in mine, my eyes were sore, my throat burning, and my head as if stuffed with cotton-wool.

This extreme discomfort lasted some thirty-six hours, when the wind moderated and we were able to stand in again on a course N. 36 W., which, to anyone who looks at the chart, will show how far we had been put out of our way. We picked up at last the lights of the Shantung peninsula, and next day came through the islands of Chefoo. We anchored off the breakwater, flying a red flag, because of the ammunition we had on board. It was again blowing a pretty hard northerly gale, and the sea outside the breakwater was so bad that the Customs launch was unable to board us. On account of the munitions we could not go inside the breakwater. We therefore stood across to some islands, under which we sheltered and anchored for the night.

Another twenty-four hours were gone. Next day the sea had gone down, and we came over and anchored outside the breakwater, when, this time, the munitions were taken from us into a lighter, after which we were allowed to enter the harbour and anchor in smooth water to discharge our Chefoo cargo.

We three passengers went ashore in the shipping company's launch. Chefoo is a little grey and white town, surrounded by high brown hills. There is a bluff above the harbour on which were flying the flags of the British and Japanese Consulates, most of the town lying below the bluff, that divides the town's two bays. There were about half a dozen steamships in the harbour and an enormous fleet of anchored junks. We landed on the Bund, walked through the narrow streets and round over the bluff to the British Consulate which overlooks the southern bay, with its bathing beach, the harbour being on the northern side. Chefoo is an example of what can be done in China on a basis of mutual good will between Chinese and foreigners. There is no Concession. Chinese sovereignty is undisputed and the place is run by a municipality, and, as far as one could see, run very successfully. Perhaps the crisp air and bright sunshine after the storm, the rain, the leaking decks and the smell of wet paint in the cabin, helped to produce a physical state predisposed to the reception of good impressions. But the Consul, with whom I had a few minutes' talk, spoke with regret of his approaching departure and with affection of the local Chinese.

We had to get back to the ship. She had finished

discharging cargo and presently went outside the breakwater, anchored again, and once more took in those cases of ammunition, which by now we heartily disliked. The wind had dropped, and as soon as the last case was on board we steamed away in a smooth sea for Tientsin, at the other side of the Gulf of Pechili. In these conditions the little steamer made eleven knots, and next morning we anchored off the Taku Bar with two hours to wait before the flood tide had risen enough to let us cross it. We crossed it, drawing 13 feet 6 inches, and I was told that if the Chinese had control of the port conservancy, the bar would be impassable in a couple of years, the assumption being that the Chinese would neglect the continual dredging that is necessary. The man who said this also said that the reason would not be that the Chinese would not wish to keep the port open, but that, in the absence of foreign control, the money for that purpose would disappear into the pockets of whoever was strong enough to take it.

LOYALTIES IN PEKING

It is difficult for the Westerner accustomed not merely to expect but to take for granted the mutual loyalty of persons on the same side in politics, war, or football matches to believe his ears if he spends some time in listening to the politicians of Peking. The Westerner who has not had his faith in human nature shaken by this experience cannot avoid a fantastic misconception of the Chinese civil war. He is bound to think of it as a struggle between North and South. It is nothing of the kind, although Northern and Southern Chinese are sufficiently antipathetic to each other to make difficult an advance of Northern troops in Southern territory or Southern troops north of the Yangtze. It is a struggle between a party (itself subject to internal quarrels) and a number of generals. The generals have had their wings clipped in Southern China. In Northern China they are still supreme. The ideas of the party are active in the North, and have infected even the civilian assistants of the generals, and similarly even in the South the old tradition is still strong enough to make every general an object of suspicion to the side for which he fights. If Chiang Kai-shek, for example, were finally to fling off the restraint of the party he would at once be accepted as a member of the informal military trade union against which he has hitherto been successfully fighting. The question at issue is really that of the divine right of generals. The unreality of the whole

conception of the North as a political unit engaged in struggle with the South is best illustrated by an examination of the Peking Government civilian officials, the generals they serve, and the relations between the generals and their rather treacherous civilian camp-followers.

There is in Peking a Government which draws occasionally a small percentage of its salary, scraping up the money to pay its officials 30 per cent. or less of a month's wages, all salaries being several months in arrears. It scrapes this money from whatever is inadvertently or perforce left over after the military authorities in command in Peking and elsewhere at the moment have been satisfied. This Government describes itself as the Government of the Republic, but is hard put to it to draw up its own constitutional family tree. Republican institutions went by the board a good many years ago, helped on their way by the Republic's over-ambitious President and the man who, having advised Yuan Shih-kai, is now said to be advising Chang Tso-lin. Since that time the Peking Government has been a thing of no importance in China, but kept up politely to enable the Legations of the foreign Powers to justify at home their continued presence in Peking. If the representatives of foreign Powers wish to play at diplomatic relations with a republic that has long ceased to exist, the Chinese soldiers are willing to provide them with playfellows, and there are plenty of persons in China ready to hear themselves undeservedly styled " Excellencies," and for the sake of sham dignity to draw sham salaries. There is a general tacit recognition that it would be

indecent to bare the facts and force the foreigners to call at the yamen in which one general keeps another a prisoner and both play a solemn game, one of the rules of which is that both must pretend to be on the same side.

The same game is played between the generals and this mock Government of theirs. At least the mock Government saves its face by publicly pretending to be real, though it is, in private, without the justification of believing in the righteousness of the generals who allow it to keep up its mockery or even in the cause (of " Peking " against the rude fellows in the South) to which, in the train of the generals, it has to pretend to be committed. The Excellencies do not wish for victory, since that would strengthen the hold of their masters the generals. They do not even expect it. Question them how you will, it is impossible to get out of them a single answer that would justify you in giving them respect. A man may be whole-heartedly wrong-headed and you may respect him. These men are without faith.

Consider the generals whom they are content to pretend to serve. I left England with the natural illusion that in China I should find a civil war going on between two parties, one of the North and the other of the South ; the Northern party rather reactionary, the Southern inclined to the opposite extreme, but both convinced that their cause was that of China. I found a civil war going on indeed, but whereas the quarrels in one party were mainly over questions of policy, the Northern party was made up of a number of different

chieftains each of whom was playing for himself: their quarrels were those of robbers over their loot, and they were actually using the Southern party as a means of damaging each other and, by lessening the strength of their supposed allies but real competitors, enhancing their own ascendancy. The first astonishing example was given by the relations between Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang. Both these generals belonged to the supposed Northern party. Sun held Shanghai. Chang was sent down to his assistance. The Kuomintang forces, in spite of their inferior armament, began to make things difficult for Sun. He asked for help. One would have expected that Chang would have hurried to assist him. Not a bit of it. Chang reasoned otherwise. Sun, his present ally, had turned him out of Shanghai in a previous private campaign. He now saw only a chance to revenge himself on Sun and to get back again to control of the surtax and secret opium revenues which fall naturally to the soldier dominant in the district. So he waited until Sun was so weak that his complete collapse was imminent, and then, and only then, brought his own troops in, called on the principal sources of revenue, and found that he had come too late to hold the place himself. Shanghai was taken by the Kuomintang.

One would have thought that this news would have been disquieting to the greater chiefs in Peking. But I found them less conscious of the loss of Shanghai than of the damage done to their allies. In that they saw positive gain. They had looked on the weakening of Sun as a means of drawing off into a dangerous

position their other ally Chang, whom they regarded as a possible competitor. His defeat was not only a Southern but also a Northern triumph. What they were thinking of in Peking was an agreement between themselves and Chiang Kai-shek, which was only possible if that swashbuckler Chang was properly hamstrung. Nanking? Let Chang try to hold it, and that would give the Kuomintang time to get him in the rear.

Turn to another part of the supposed "Northern" front, to Honan, where Wu Pei-fu, driven from Hankow, was sitting composing poetry while his subordinate generals amused themselves with opium and Mah Jong. The whole of this province was given over to indistinguishable soldiery and banditry. The civilian authorities were having a hard time to raise even a hundred dollars to dole out among the staff. Chang Tso-lin was urging Wu Pei-fu to march down the railway to Hankow and thereby deal the Southerners a hard blow. Wu replied that he had no money. Chang Tso-lin would not give him any, but, remembering old rivalries, saw his chance of eliminating a man whose reputation as a patriot stood higher than his own (which, among Chinese, stands very low because of his relations with the Japanese). Argument continued during the whole of the Kuomintang advance on Shanghai, and ended with a demand that if Wu would not himself advance he should give a clear road for an advance by somebody else. Wu temporised. Chang Tso-lin sent his son with large forces into Wu's territory, with the result that the bulk of the local soldiery (unwilling to be dis-

turbed) turned against both Wu and Chang, and Wu was obliged to fly for his life. The Kuomintang, well aware of the state of Honan, avoided entering that province, saying they would leave that hornets' nest for other fingers. Chang's son (Chang Hsueh-liang) pushed in and won three great victories one after the other which cost him three armies and the territory he had gained. The ground was subsequently made good by the Northerners, but these disastrous victories at the outset were a very severe blow to Chang Tso-lin—so severe, indeed, that Japanese comment (always intimately informed on the subject of Chang) suggested that he might have at once to withdraw behind the Great Wall.

The reception of all this news by Chang's Pekingese civilian advisers was extraordinarily illuminating. Were they dismayed by this long series of misfortunes for the armies that, one would suppose, they considered as their own? Not at all. One of them told me calmly, "You need not imagine that we are not just as much in favour of civilian control as they are at Hankow. Why, we ourselves advised Chang Tso-lin to make his attack on the South while the Japanese were advising him to sit still. Things have turned out excellently. It will be a long time before Chang Tso-lin can recover and a long time before the Japanese will forgive him. He is weakened both ways, and the weaker he is the more chance there is for the civilians. He may even have to leave Peking." It was as if during a war a British Privy Councillor were to rejoice in the defeat of British troops because he considered that British generals were

rather too powerful at home. Chang's difficulties were at that moment rather less than his advisers hoped, but it is worth recording that then, when his outlook seemed gloomy, his military and civilian supporters were in direct correspondence with the leaders in the South.

THE SPLIT IN THE KUOMINTANG

THERE is a good deal of secret history behind the recently announced intention of the Central Control Committee of the Kuomintang to impeach certain members of the Hankow Government, which may mean the abandonment by the Nationalists of any attempt immediately to push forward north of the Yangtze. The tension that has at last brought about an open breach in the Kuomintang ranks dates from the time that Dr. Sun Yat-sen opened those ranks to admit the Chinese Communists. The Communists were admitted on explicit terms—namely, that while remaining Communists they should, as members of the Kuomintang, be bound by the discipline of that party. This in the early stages of the advance to the North was possible, because the immediate aims of Communist and non-Communist members of the Kuomintang were identical. Also, both recognised that the Chinese revolution was, by reason of the economic state of China, a " bourgeois " and not a " proletarian " revolution. The Chinese Communists threw themselves into the organisation of Labour, and, though few in numbers, made up for this in temperamental energy. The non-Communists recognised that every " bourgeois " revolution has been won for the bourgeoisie by the activity of the masses, and were soon given practical proof of the efficacy of mass movement in sweeping away obstacles of every kind. Labour prepared the

towns to welcome the Nationalist advance. The peasant organisations cleared the way for that advance in the country and greatly contributed to the unification of the country the Nationalists held. The most active organisers of workmen and peasants alike were temperamentally inclined to extreme opinion, and so to membership of the Communist party. Membership of that party in China implied not so much subscription to the theories of Marx or Lenin as proclamation of a readiness to do or die.

With success, with the spread of Kuomintang control over an area nearly half as large as Europe, this unity of aim between Communist and other members of the Kuomintang became much less certain. On the one hand the Communist Labour leaders were naturally conscious that it was very largely owing to their efforts that the Nationalist troops, armed largely with umbrellas and bamboo poles, had beaten the Northern troops in spite of their infinitely better equipment in death-dealing devices. On the other, Moscow began to talk rather more loudly than before of the possibility in China of, as it were, side-stepping capitalism and arriving at something like Socialism without first creating a capitalist State. The Communists in the Kuomintang, elated by their proved power of inducing mass action, began more and more clearly to feel that they had a programme of their own which was not fully expressed in the programme of the Kuomintang. At the same time the Chinese bourgeois revolution, having, in Canton, for example, obtained its local and immediate aims, was rapidly coming to think that untrammelled Labour

agitation, while an excellent means of weakening its enemies, was altogether too much of a good thing when it was continued in places where the revolution was already in control. The business men, the bankers, who had been all on the side of the Nationalists as against the war-lords, were beginning to cry out that war-lords were not much more damaging to business than Labour leaders who had acquired a sort of drug habit in an unquenchable thirst for feeling their own power.

One of China's chief difficulties is her immense size. Another is the almost incredible poorness of her communications. When, after the capture of Hankow, the Nationalist Government moved from Canton to the Yangtze and moved as fast as possible, they were nearly a month on the way, travelling all the time. A great part of that journey had to be made on foot. It consequently happens that the Chinese revolution is in different stages in different places. One of China's chief assets is the irrepressible desire to trade of the Chinese trader. No matter how disturbed the country, somehow or other he will carry on. In the actual war zone he will not allow his trading to be brought actually to a stop, and the moment a district is free from war he demands to be allowed to trade freely, and will trade whether he is allowed or not. Any Chinese merchant killed and dissected will be found to have " Business as usual " engraved upon his heart. There is no such fatalistic torpor as was seen in Russia in similar circumstances, and there is instead a desperate hurry to get back to work as soon as the silence of the guns allows one Chinese to hear another offer him five dollars

for something for which he has asked ten. Consequently, as soon as the active turmoil of revolution had left Canton for the Yangtze, Cantonese supporters of the Kuomintang began to be more conscious of the trouble they were themselves receiving from the Labour leaders than of the trouble which was being created for their enemies. In Hankow, when I was there, the balance was fairly even, but even the most moderate of the Nationalists was very sure that the suppression of extreme Labour agitation before the capture of Shanghai would amount simply to a decision to give up the idea of capturing that city. Again, no farther away than Nanchang General Chiang Kai-shek was finding Labour activities behind his front almost more of a nuisance than Labour activities behind his enemy's front were an advantage to him. The revolution was at a different stage in its development at every point in Nationalist China, with the result that tensions of all kinds were inevitable.

These tensions found expression in a struggle over the position of the Communists inside the Kuomintang party, complicated by a general fear lest the party, by losing control of its chief general, should lose for the Nationalists the main plank in their platform, with the substitution of civilian for military control. The first serious tussle came over the seat of government, General Chiang Kai-shek wanting it to be at Nanchang, where were his own headquarters, and the bulk of the political leaders at Hankow wanting it to be at Hankow. This question was settled in favour of Hankow, and the result was described as "a victory for the party."

Meanwhile, however, certain people at Hankow, notably Hsu Chien, the Minister of Justice, were taking liberties with the constitution of the Kuomintang and allowing decisions to be taken by an irregularly constituted body which should properly be in the exclusive competence of the Central Executive Committee. The result of this was a marked strengthening of the Communist influence in Hankow and a marked strengthening of criticism of the group at Hankow by members of the Kuomintang elsewhere, who began openly to fear that the Communist party inside the Kuomintang was not working as a homogeneous part of the whole, but was considering itself as a sort of embryo inside the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang merely as the chrysalis which that embryo would eventually burst asunder. One curious symptom of the anxiety felt by all its members about the fate of the party was the urgent desire expressed in Hankow for the return of Wang Ching-wei, the chairman of the Political Council, who, after disagreeing with Chiang Kai-shek over the powers of the political commissars in the army (over which Chiang had his way), had left China on grounds of ill-health. Wang is a person of great authority, and it was felt in Hankow that party difficulties would vanish on his return. But it seems that Chiang Kai-shek was no less eager than the Lefts for Wang's return. Certainly, when he arrived, Chiang sent out a circular telegram welcoming him in the warmest terms and declaring that henceforth he would be able to devote himself exclusively to military matters. Chiang Kai-shek has more than once shown that he is fully aware that but

for the Kuomintang behind him he would be no more than any other general.[1]

This point, however, is not understood in the North, and the party question in the South has been complicated by general knowledge of the " secret " negotiations which have for some time been going on between agents of both sides. These would-be peacemakers are inclined to let their hopes run away with their tongues, so that neither side has a very clear idea of what it is offered. But it is pretty generally known in the South that the agents of General Yang Yu-ting, who controls General Chang Tso-lin, have said that the only thing preventing agreement between North and South is the presence of the Russian influence at Hankow. Now, a Northern general like Yang Yu-ting can only think in terms of generals, and he, without mentioning the Kuomintang or even the Nationalists, has said that he can come to terms with Chiang as soon as Chiang can settle Hankow, and that while Chiang is fighting General Teng Sheng-chi, who is opposing him at Hankow, the Northern generals will not interfere with him. It is partly the knowledge of these negotiations and these suggestions that embitters the struggle of tendencies inside the Kuomintang.

[1] The Kuomintang has ceased to be behind him, and Chiang Kai-shek has, at least for a time, left the Chinese political scene.

C. C. WU

RESIDENTS in China never express surprise at any sudden turn or twist in public or private affairs. In that country everything is possible except obvious consistency. It is therefore not astonishing that C. C. Wu, the new Foreign Minister of the Nationalist Government (Nanking branch), should be appointed by the Chiang Kai-shek party in the present split, although less than a year ago he was given by Chiang Kai-shek no more than twenty-four hours in which to depart from Canton.

In May 1926 Chiang Kai-shek accused C. C. Wu of being too intimately connected with Hong-Kong, and of having shown a readiness to discuss a loan of such a size and character as would cripple Cantonese independence. C. C. Wu was given clearly to understand that Canton would be no place for him twenty-four hours later, and, in the practical Chinese manner, he at once recognised the wisdom of seeking sanctuary elsewhere. When the Nationalists captured Shanghai, Wu, resident in the Settlement, was already in friendly correspondence with Chiang Kai-shek, and was presently appointed Foreign Minister, his assumption of office being, however, postponed until Eugene Chen, of Hankow, should have settled up the difficulty with the Powers that arose after the battle for possession of Nanking.

No story in China, however, is as simple as it appears.

That of C. C. Wu's hurried disappearance from Canton is told in two other versions, both true, which help to explain how it is that, after being hounded from Canton less than a year ago, he should now be called in to succeed his successor, Eugene Chen. These other stories explain the seeming inconsistency of Chiang Kai-shek. In May 1926 Chiang Kai-shek, then, as now, afraid of the growth of Communist influence in the Kuomintang, had been about to propose that their power should be curbed by prohibiting any Communist from being head of a department under the Executive Committee. Wu pointed out that the heads of departments took their orders from the Standing Committee, and put forward the suggestion that they should prohibit Communists from being members of the Standing Committee. Left opposition to this was what made his position in Canton untenable. That story shows him going farther than Chiang in the direction in which Chiang wished to go.

But the third story shows that on another point, more important in Chiang's eyes than this of internal party politics, Wu was opposed to Chiang. He was among those members of the Kuomintang who were opposed to the whole idea of the Northern Expedition which brought the Nationalists to the Yangtze. Kwangtung province had by that time been brought entirely under Nationalist rule. The question before the party was, " What next ? " There were three groups. One looked on Kwangtung as the base from which to spread the Nationalist Revolution over all China. One wished to make it a model province, and one, the least respectable, looked upon it as a perquisite of victory, not believing

in either of these possibilities. Wu belonged to the second group. The most important person in the third group was the Chief of Police in Canton, Wu Ti-sing, who was hated by Chiang Kai-shek for having from personal motives refrained from bringing his 3,000 men to help Dr. Sun in the dark days when Dr. Sun had to take refuge on a gunboat. Wu Ti-sing was extremely powerful, had been in Canton a long time, and had used his position as Chief of Police to make roots for himself of every kind. The questions mentioned in the other stories threatened a split in the party, which both groups opposed to the Northern Expedition sought to widen. The first group arrested Wu Ti-sing. This arrest of a man whose position was considered impregnable broke up both the opposition groups, and C. C. Wu and the other leaders of the second group left hurriedly for foreign Settlements. Only after these two groups had been thus suppressed was the Northern Expedition possible.

The Northern Expedition has now brought the Nationalists to the Yangtze. C. C. Wu's opposition to it has ceased, and accordingly the main obstacle to collaboration between him and Chiang Kai-shek no longer exists, while their points of sympathy, in dislike of Communist influence in the Kuomintang, have been emphasised by Chiang Kai-shek's quarrel with Hsu Chien in Hankow. It would be wrong to suppose that either Chiang or C. C. Wu has any personal feeling against Eugene Chen, who is generally felt to have done well for China in circumstances of great difficulty. Chen, however, considers that to break up the party at

this point is to take a very grave risk, whereas C. C. Wu believes that this is the precise moment at which that risk must be taken.

C. C. Wu is a man of forty-one, a son of the famous Wu Ting-fang who, after long diplomatic service, was in retirement in Shanghai in 1911, joined the Revolution, informed Yuan Shih-kai that the Republic would accept him if he would accept the Republic, offered Sun Yat-sen the Presidency, was Minister of Justice in Sun's Cabinet, and Premier after the death of Yuan Shih-kai. C. C. Wu was educated in America and England, where he was called to the Bar. He was appointed by the Peking Government a plenipotentiary delegate to the Washington Conference, but declined to accept the appointment. He was Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Dr. Sun's Government in 1923, a Commissioner of the Canton Government in 1925, a member of the Military Council, and Mayor of Canton.

I had a long talk with him in Shanghai shortly before the arrival of the Nationalists, when he very carefully defined his attitude towards the Communists in the Kuomintang. For him, the Chinese Communists inside the Kuomintang are the cuckoo's egg in the tree-sparrow's nest. He said :—

I am not afraid of Communism, which is an admirable ideal, the realisation of which may be witnessed by my grandchildren. [Eugene Chen is much more sceptical.] What I am afraid of is Communists. The Communists as a party asked Dr. Sun to allow them to enter the Kuomintang. He agreed on condition that they should accept the Three Principles, and that when in the Kuomintang they should behave as members of it. But as a matter of fact we find that

since they have been in the Kuomintang they have been acting as an organised faction and are, while within it, working to strengthen their position with a view to an eventual struggle between themselves and it. I should have no objection whatever to working with them as an allied party, but I think it dangerous that we should allow them to be identified with us.

I asked whether a certain man with whom I had talked was a Communist. Wu said :—

With us the Communists do not declare themselves. In Russia you know who is a Communist and who is not, but, until recently, in all but a very small area of China Communists had short shrift. They do not advertise themselves as such. A few, of course, are notorious, and do not attempt to disguise their views or allegiance. But most of them do not declare their membership of the Communist party. We do not ask them. The Kuomintang is not like the Bolshevik party in Russia. It makes no strict inquiry. There is no long period of probation. All that is necessary is to sign a paper expressing certain beliefs and you are a member of the Kuomintang. It is a most hospitable party.

The story of the Turkish Nationalists' relations with Russia and their subsequent dealings with Turkish Communists was mentioned. I asked when, in his opinion, the time that he foresaw would come when the objects of the Communists and the Kuomintang would cease to be identical. Wu said, " I believe that moment has already arrived. Already the actions of the Communists are compromising the Kuomintang and strengthening its enemies."

That belief among some of the older members of the Kuomintang explains their willingness at this moment to precipitate a split in the party. They do not see the affair as a split, but think of it merely as a

separation of the Kuomintang from its Communist allies. It becomes a split because many members of the Kuomintang take the view that the moment for separation has not yet come, because separation will mean the suppression of Labour leaders, and so indirectly the alienation of that instinctive mass support which has hitherto made up for the Nationalists' inferiority in military equipment.

THE CHINESE PUZZLE

It is difficult for foreigners to remember that the Chinese puzzle is something that primarily concerns the Chinese, and that the problem of our relations with China, while it compels us to watch with the closest interest the attempt of the Chinese to solve their puzzle, does not compel us to join in that rather uproarious puzzle-solving. Some newspapers write and a great many people talk of events now taking place in China as if they were being affronted by another Indian Mutiny. We have to remind ourselves that China is not a Crown Colony nor a Dominion, and that she is not in any way a part of or bound to the British Empire. China is a country legally as independent of England as is France or Norway. She is a member of the League of Nations, with the same rights in that assembly as our own. Nor can it be said that the British Empire owns any Chinese territory, unless we count Hong-Kong, which rocky island (as far from Peking as Sicily is from London) was ceded to us as " a place where our merchants might careen their ships," after we had demonstrated to the Chinese that our weapons and methods of warfare were more efficient than their own. The Shanghai Settlement, at the moment turned into a sort of bramble-patch of barbed wire and severely overcrowded with our troops, is neither British nor International territory, but Chinese. We persuaded the Chinese to give us the right to live there on the definite understanding

that our presence there was not to be construed as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty. Similarly the other Concessions are not British freeholds, but leaseholds of the kind that a powerful and turbulent tenant may extract from the most unwilling landlord if he, unable to defend himself, can find no defender.

There is, of course, a great deal more to be said for our present position than this. We are tenants who have greatly increased the value of the properties which have thus been lent to us. We have some right in those increased values. It is asking too much to expect that they will be abandoned altogether. But we confuse our own judgment if we mistake our actual standing. We, like the Chinese, must remember that we are tenants, not proprietors, and that we are not tenants who answered advertisements seeking such, but tenants of the strong arm who forced their way in. It is not our presence in China that makes the Chinese puzzle seem disproportionately connected with ourselves, but the terms on which we are there. These are such that they can be maintained only by a continuous and expensive display of force. The old pacifist landlord has died, and the new one insists on a review of the position. It begins to look as if the friction involved in an obstinate sticking to leases obtained from the old man and to precedents established when he was in his dotage, in face of the obvious dissatisfaction of his successor, makes it less certain than it used to be that the retention of such leases and precedents is serving its original purpose, which was the promotion of British trade.

Recognition of this is the motive of the British Proposals published on February 3rd of this year. Those proposals, if carried out, would make it more difficult for the Chinese puzzle-solvers to distract each other's attention by references to us. They represent the opening moves of a new policy, outlined in Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech of January 29th—a new policy which would hasten the solution of the Chinese puzzle by making it much more difficult to blame us for its seeming insolubility. But it is dangerous to blind ourselves to the opposition which this policy meets, not so much from the Chinese as from our own nationals in China. So much resentment has been produced by the terms of these old leases and by subsequent encroachments upon Chinese rights by no means foreseen when the leases were drawn up, by the extraordinary privileges enjoyed by the leaseholders, and by the decidedly provocative attitude of privileged foreigners with regard to unprivileged Chinese, that we have had for many years to keep warships in the ports and waters of a supposedly friendly country, and, latterly, have greatly increased our naval strength there, besides landing in China a very considerable army. The presence of these forces, necessary though they may be, gravely increases the risks to which the policy of the Proposals is subject, by making submission to that policy seem less inevitable and by making it seem to our nationals in China that an alternative policy is possible. With all these troops about, with all these ships, why not hit the Chinese into submission so that for another space of years we need not have to make up our minds to the changes which the Proposals threaten ?

China is certainly generous in offering to other countries all the excuses for annexation. The Chinese puzzle includes for the Chinese the removal of these excuses. The problem for us is, whether we want them removed or not? The Shanghailanders will say at once that no one has ever dreamed of taking China. The answer to that is that, whether they are conscious of it or not, the logical end of the policy that is their alternative to that of the British Proposals is the subjugation of China. Indeed, the actual trend of history has seemed to be in that direction. Shanghai is the chief manifestation of the foreigner in China, and no fair-minded person can deny that the policy of Shanghai has been a consistent policy of encroachment on Chinese rights. No signatory to the agreement that gave foreigners the right to live on the land that is now the Settlement imagined that they would eventually form there a practically independent plutocratic republic, containing within itself what is, to all intents and purposes, the vital organ of China's financial and commercial system. If we follow the history of China's foreign relations from 1842 to 1914, we perceive that it has been the history of the gradual loss of independence, the falling under foreign control of one after another properly Chinese activity. China's Customs duties were limited by the foreigner to the advantage of the foreign manufacturer. The limited revenue thus obtained came to have as a first charge upon it the payment of interest on loans which to a large extent had been made necessary by foreign aggression. Communication by water came to be largely by foreign vessels. Railways were

built and remained largely under foreign control. The approval of the foreign diplomatic body in Peking came to be necessary for the expenditure of money, on which there was no foreign claim, for purposes of domestic interest to China. Foreign banks increasingly profited by the turnover of Chinese money, and so obtained a position of overwhelming strength against any Chinese competitors. Meanwhile Chinese State life was growing more and more unstable. Rebellions were crushed with foreign help. Parts of the country warred with other parts, and the life of the common man was neither peaceful nor secure. There was no loyalty. Justice was to be bought. Public opinion regarded public office as justification for dipping in the public purse. With such preliminaries as these, and on grounds no stronger, empires have before now passed under the complete dominion of foreigners, who, by conquest, have at least made life bearable for the population as a whole, have administered justice, kept order, and, for long periods, have done these things with the general consent of a once proud and independent people. Are we to complete the process that has gone so far? Are foreigners eventually to rule China for the Chinese and to carry throughout the public services the same efficiency and honesty that they have brought to the collection and administration of the Maritime Customs? The prospect is perhaps attractive.

But there are other things to be considered. One of them is the size of the country. China is a long way distant, and for most people all countries far distant tend to seem about the same size. Further, of course,

all *foreign* countries have an easily notable tendency to shrink. Our atlases, for example, devote no more space to China than to Ireland, and much less space to China than to England. We have therefore to resist, in looking at China, a natural inclination to look through the wrong end of the telescope. It is well to remind ourselves now and again that the area of China is rather larger than that of Europe, and that its population, which has never been properly counted, is, if not as large, at least not very much less. We are therefore not dealing with a country on our small, European, domestic scale, but with something very like a continent. Even so, we could, without foreign assistance, if we were guaranteed from foreign opposition, " take China " for a time by extending our existing system of floating garrisons and setting up forts in the proper places. From a naval point of view China is already occupied. Our ships can and do enter every port where there is room for them. They patrol the Yangtze for a thousand miles into the interior of the country. They are able to order Chinese battleships to shift their billets if they have anchored inconveniently close. They are able to make it possible for foreign ships to disregard the puzzle-solving civil war of the Chinese. The Governments both at Hankow and at Nanking deliberate within rifle-shot of our floating forts, capable at any moment of blowing these towns to pieces. Occupation has already been carried as far as if, reversing the position, our Ministers could look out at Westminster to see Chinese warships, bigger than any English ones, anchored uninvited in the Thames. But it has resulted in making

the Chinese unanimous about one thing at least—unanimous in a desire to see the end of that occupation, and of the exasperating foreign privileges the defence of which makes it necessary.

China's submission to the foreigner has always been unwilling. There has never been anything like the Russian invitation to the Variags to come in and rule. Her resentment and resistance is not decreasing but increasing. A new generation of Chinese has grown up with enough Western knowledge to resent in a Western manner what any Westerner would feel to be national humiliation. If anything is clear to the observer of the Chinese puzzle it is that a new class is forcing its way to the front. When that happens, even when it uses, as in Russia, the slogans of internationalism, the result is an extraordinary crystallisation of national feeling. We can hold our present privileges and keep up our present occupation in China only against increasing hostility. Increasing hostility may bring about extension of the occupation, when the great distances and poor communications that now protract the Chinese civil war will serve the Chinese in keeping up a perpetual rebellion. We should soon be spending more than the total turnover of our Chinese trade, and we should have taken upon ourselves the Chinese puzzle, the solving of which sooner or later we should have to surrender to the Chinese.

The alternative to this fantastic prospect is complete acceptance of the policy of the British Proposals, with all that they imply. We must prevent Shanghai from forcing the Chinese to mistake our gifts for trophies

wrested from unwilling hands. We must, by removing the counter-irritant of foreign privilege, force the Chinese to the exclusive consideration of their own problem. We must recognise that while for many years to come China may not be a comfortable place for people without extra-territorial rights, it is already a place in which it is unprofitable, and will soon be a place in which it will be impossible, to retain them. One result of this will be a salutary filtering of foreign settlers, ensuring that for the most part Englishmen in China will be persons who take the trouble to learn Chinese and are consequently not only better fitted to look after themselves in that country but also better fitted for the furtherance of British trade. The Germans lost their extra-territorial rights half a dozen years ago, but the loss has not prevented a marked recovery of German business in China from a position in which, so far as other foreigners could arrange it, it was dead. There is a Chinese proverb : " A rich man thinks of the future, a poor man of the present." England is rich enough " not to ignore the present inconveniences and difficulties, but to think of her relations with China in the next century."

THE PROGRAMME OF THE KUOMINTANG

It should be remembered that this programme was passed by the Kuomintang in Canton *after* the so-called break with the Right Wing which took place early in 1926. The programme therefore is that of a Kuomintang inclined decidedly towards the Left. Yet, what is it but the programme of business men, regrettably persuaded of the advantages of protection through having had to submit for many years to our compulsion of something like free trade—business men who in their efforts to do away with the handicaps of Chinese business seek the support of the farmers in their campaign against a regime as disastrous to farmers as to trade and manufactures; who seek the support of Labour by setting up a pious programme of Labour reform, safeguarding themselves by reference to the state of industry which may delay the adoption of the measures proposed; who do not forget that soldiers have to be humoured, that the town in which they are deliberating is deeply interested in the development of a particular port and a particular railway (both named accordingly), and that for thirty years the chief financial support of the revolutionary movement in China has been that given by Chinese living abroad.

As it is here printed, the programme is the result of careful comparison of three translations of the original by English-speaking Chinese. Even apart from its interest as a document that tells us, at least, what the

revolutionaries want their supporters to think they mean to do, it is indirectly an extraordinary illustration of the present state of China. A political programme that finds it necessary to mention punishment of officers who embezzle soldiers' pay, that expresses a pious wish for the suppression of bandits, that holds up a 54-hour working week as a doubtfully attainable ideal, that proclaims that wages and salaries are to be paid in full, helps to make us realise the need of some radical change in China.

PROGRAMME OF THE KUOMINTANG

(Passed at a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee with delegates from all Provincial Committees in October 1926, in Canton.)

GENERAL POLICY

POLITICAL :—

1. The political and economic unification of China.
2. The abolition of the Tuchun, Tupan, and similar systems of militarism, and the establishment of democratic government.
3. Absolute freedom of assembly, speech, and the Press.
4. Self-determination for national minorities in the country.
5. Severe punishment of corrupt officials and the establishment of clean and honest government.

IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS :—

6. Abrogation of unequal treaties.
7. The conclusion with foreign countries of new treaties that shall fully respect the sovereign rights of China.
8. The enforcement of proper regulations respecting investment of foreign capital in China (which must not be used in the furtherance of colonial policies for the exploitation of China).

ECONOMIC :—

9. Tariff autonomy.
10. Abolition of Likin system.
11. Introduction of a new system of taxation and elimination of unjust and miscellaneous taxes and duties.
12. Unification of the national finance.
13. Railway construction, in particular completion of the Canton–Hankow Railway.
14. Construction of national highroads.
15. Promotion of river conservancy.
16. Harbour construction, with special attention to the completion of the port of Whampoa.
17. Unification of the currency.
18. Standardisation of weights and measures.
19. Establishment of a national bank for financing, at minimum rates of interest, the development of agriculture, industry, and commerce.
20. Progressive income tax.
21. Improvement of the system for the collection of land taxes.

EDUCATION

22. Reform of the present system of public education.
23. Assignation of a special fund for public education.
24. Compulsory registration under Chinese law of all missionary schools and other schools established by foreigners.
25. Introduction of compulsory education and promotion of technical education.
26. Development of the popular movement against illiteracy.

ADMINISTRATIVE

27. A general census and the registration of marriages, births, and deaths.
28. General survey and the registration of all title deeds.
29. Establishment of ordinary and special municipalities throughout the country. (The capital of a province, a commercial port, or a city with a population exceeding 200,000 shall be made a special municipality.)
30. Local self-government for villages.

31. Suppression of bandits.
32. Prohibition of opium-smoking, opium traffic, and poppy-growing to be enforced after a fixed date.

MILITARY :—

33. Inauguration of a system of party representatives, i.e. a party representative shall be attached to every military unit of the army.
34. Establishment of schools for the training of party representatives.
35. Military service to be made obligatory on all members of the party.
36. Establishment of military-political academies in other provinces besides the one already established at Whampoa, Kwangtung.
37. Establishment of a Central Political and Military University.
38. Establishment of a Military Council and a Ministry of War, the relations between them to be determined by the Political Council.
39. Distinct separation of the rights and duties of military and civil authorities ; under no circumstances may the military interfere with the civil administration except in a war area under martial law, when the civil administration must submit to the military authorities.
40. Fixed estimates to be made for both the provincial and national armies, which estimates shall not encroach upon the legitimate needs of the central or provincial governments.
41. Officers and soldiers with military merits shall be duly decorated without reference to their ranks.
42. Encouragement of military education throughout the country.
43. Development of military aviation.

POSITION OF WOMEN :—

44. Legally, politically, economically, educationally, and socially, women are to be the equals of men.
45. A holiday of sixty days with pay is to be granted to women civil servants during confinement.

INDUSTRY

46. Adoption of the policy of Protection.
47. Home manufactures shall be encouraged by the Government by giving them preference in Government purchases.
48. State assistance in the development of new industries.
49. Preferential rates in taxation for domestic industries.
50. Formation of industrial associations, convocation of a national industrial conference. Organisation of a national exhibition of Chinese manufactured goods to be held as soon as possible at Canton or at Wu-han.
51. Abolition of all special privileges enjoyed by foreign industrial concerns in China.
52. Establishment of industrial schools.

COMMERCE

53. Safe transport and communication, due protection of merchants and travellers.
54. Prohibition of all levies of illegitimate taxes.
55. Withdrawal from circulation of depreciated bank-notes.
56. Revision in accordance with mercantile interests of the law concerning chambers of commerce.
57. Prohibition of financial and food profiteering.

EDUCATIONAL WORKERS

58. Increase in teachers' salaries, especially in the salaries of elementary school teachers.
59. Regular and full payment of salaries.
60. Salaries to continue during legal holidays and during sick-leave.
61. Fixed pensions for school-teachers and insurance against death or retirement.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE

62. Standard scale of salaries for civil servants.
63. Regular and full monthly payment.
64. Insurance of civil servants against death or sickness.

65. Establishment of a pension system.
66. A half-month annual holiday on full pay for every civi servant.

AGRICULTURE

67. Twenty-five per cent. reduction of rent on agricultural lands.
68. Uniform system of land taxation. Abolition of illegal taxes.
69. Exemption from payment of rent for agricultural land in time of famine. Prohibition of the collection of rent in advance.
70. Improvement of irrigation systems.
71. Conservation of forests. Compulsory provincial afforestation of the mountainous and waste lands.
72. Improvement of rural education.
73. Establishment of district and provincial agricultural banks to lend money to farmers at a maximum rate of 5 per cent. annual interest.
74. Allocation of provincial public land as a capital land fund for the agricultural banks.
75. Distribution by provincial governments of undeveloped public land among the poorer peasants.
76. Prohibition of usury. Rate of interest on loans shall not exceed 20 per cent. per annum.
77. Government aid in the organization of enterprises for the development of uncultivated lands.
78. Government aid in the formation of farmers' co-operative societies.
79. Famine relief and prevention to be undertaken by the Government.
80. No collection of land taxes in advance.
81. Proper investigation of protests by farmers against illegitimate taxes and other grievances by a special Government committee in which the peasants' union shall be represented.
82. Prohibition of unfair conditions in land leases and in the mortgage of title deeds.
83. Village affairs to be administered in each village by a council elected by its adult villagers.

84. Peasants to have the right to form peasants' unions
85. Support of the peasants' unions in their rights.
86. Peasants' unions to have the right to organise volunteer corps for the purposes of self-defence.
87. Prohibition of armed attacks against peasants.
88. Prohibition of the tenant contract system.

LABOUR

[Recognising that owing to China being in a semi-colonial state, to which is due the weakness of her finance, the backwardness of her industry (apart from that which is under foreign control), and the slowness of its development, the following clauses of our programme shall be carried out in so far as that is possible in the present condition of Chinese industry.[1]]

89. Enactment of labour law giving the workers the right to organise and the right to strike, and restricting excessive exploitation by employers, with special reference to protection of female and child labour.

    There shall be a special set of regulations for the treatment of labourers working in the arsenal, in the military transport service, and in other military institutions, which regulations must be such as not in any way to hinder the progress of the revolutionary movement.
90. Enactment of labour union laws, improvement of the organisation of labour unions and removal of the causes of conflict between labour unions.
91. Payment of wages for a 54-hour working week during legal holidays.
92. Abolition of the contract-labour system.
93. Enactment of a labour insurance law and the insurance of labour against unemployment, sickness, and death.
94. Establishment of labour and capital arbitration councils to decide disputes between labour and capital with a view to satisfying the legitimate demands of labour, in particular with regard to wages.

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[1] This qualifying clause is not included in all copies of the programme.—A. R.

95. Improvement of working-men's housing, with particular attention to sanitary conditions.
96. Establishment of special schools for labourers and for their children, to raise the standard of intelligence and the technical ability of the workers.
97. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of labourers' co-operative consumers' societies.

SOLDIERS

98. The resolutions with regard to improvement of the soldiers' living conditions adopted at the Second National Convention of the Kuomintang shall be strictly carried out.
99. Enactment of regulations for improved treatment of ex-service men.
100. Enactment of regulations for improved treatment of disabled soldiers.
101. Liberal compensation for the families of soldiers killed in action.
102. Payment in full and regularly each month of the salaries of soldiers and junior military officers. Severe punishment of officers who discount or delay the payment of salaries to soldiers.

CHINESE IMMIGRANTS ABROAD

103. To ensure that Chinese residing abroad shall enjoy equal privileges with citizens of other nations.
104. The provision of adequate educational facilities for the children of Chinese emigrants when they return home for their schooling.
105. The provision of special protection to industrial enterprises organized by returned Chinese emigrants.

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